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THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT-REAL AND
APPARENT ISSUES: AN INSIGHT INTO
ITS FUTURE FROM THE LESSONS
OF THE PAST
M. CHERIF BAssIOUNI-
AND
EUGENE M. FISHER-"-
OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND
THE INTERNATIONAL PROCESS
The Arab-Israeli confrontation provides the world community
with one of history's greatest opportunities for implementation of the
"Rule of Law" as a substitute for the "Rule of Force" in international
relations and institutionalized conflicts. Thus far, unfortunately, the
opportunity has proved elusive and the challenge has gone unanswered.
The world community continues to clamor for peace, order, and
justice, but yet is unable or unwilling to attain any of those avowed
goals.
The resolution of conflicts in a consensual system of law, such
as international law, is rendered difficult by the lack of fact-finding
processes, inadequate analytical methodology, non-compulsory adjudica-
tion, and unenforceable dispositions and determinations. However,
unlike most international conflicts, the Arab-Israeli dispute is not
clouded by seriously controverted facts. Virtually all of its elements
are grounded in issues which are susceptible to legal formulation and,
hence, of juridical adjudication and determination.
In juridical controversies, the manner in which the relevant issues
are formulated is frequently outcome-determinative. Notwithstanding,
modern world conflicts have been shaped by what is referred to as
"world public opinion." (The most significant aspect of this state of
affairs is that world public opinion can, and frequently does formulate
issues which, through repetition, become so solidified that they some-
times cannot be altered by the very parties to the conflict.) When one
considers the informational sources of world public opinion, it is
clear that all too often they are either the product of a guided or con-
trolled governmental policy or subject to the more subtle, but almost
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equally, effective pressure of nongovernmental, politically-oriented inter-
ests. Additionally, one cannot overlook the impact of propaganda upon
such already doubtful credentials. This word, often misused, is a
euphemism for the propagation of information, which can range from
biased to falsified, by means of "facts" scientifically dispensed by inter-
ested governments or political pressure groups acting directly or
through covert channels. Ever since Paul Joseph Goebbels mastered
it in the 1930's, propaganda has become a weapon of such magnitude
that its effectiveness can be raised to the level of indirect or subjective
aggression. Its subliminal impact affects world public opinion by
implanting a version of the facts which is conducive to the formulation
of issues in a controlled (outcome-determinative) manner. And when
considering the American system of criminal justice, in which trial
by public opinion has been recognized as devastatingly prejudical
from a psychological and legal point of view, one can only imagine the
effects of propaganda on a discipline such as international law, in
which, in addition to such psychological considerations, world pub-
lic opinion becomes forum and fact-finder, free to formulate and
sustain the issues by a selective and often discriminating choice of
supporting facts.
The observer will not fail to recognize that in the Arab-Israeli
conflict, world public opinion has been shaped and conditioned by
exposure to a biased version of the facts as a paper curtain has ap-
parently fallen on any aspect of the conflict which supports the Arab
position. In spite of these obstacles, however, intellectual honesty, as
well as the tradition of the legal profession, requires that this position
be examined.
The "international process"' of conflict resolution usually becomes
operative when the parties to the controversy submit to one of its
classical devices, i.e., conciliation, negotiation, mediation, arbitration
or adjudication. However, quite often one of the parties will under-
take a "holding pattern," awaiting further development, or perhaps,
termination of the crisis.
In either case, the basic consideration will not only be predicated
upon proposed resolutory grounds; rather, such delaying tactics will
generally be pursued in conjunction with a guided campaign to con-
dition world public opinion to a particular version of the conflict.
1 The term "international process" includes all aspects of international interrelation-
ships, encompassing political and diplomatic action by one nation-state vis-A-vis another
as well as the workings of international organizations through which conflicts may be
channelled.
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Accordingly, this period will be characterized by an escalation of
propaganda efforts which are often destined to conceal the real issues
behind apparent ones. Whether the issues advanced by the parties or
by world public opinion are indeed real will become evident only
when the international process attempts to fashion a solution to the
conflict. When reasonable solutions are thwarted or rejected, it will
then be clear that the apparent issues were camouflage for the real
ones which were concealed, in whole or in part, for reasons better
known to the concealing party or parties. While these observations
may appear elementary, they do provide a foundation for the proposi-
tion that, even though virtually all of the issues arising from the Arab-
Israeli confrontation can be juridically formulated, no juridical solution
to the conflict has been achieved because the issues, as presented, are not
in fact real.
THE LEGAL ISSUES2
The following schematic statement of the apparent issues arising
from the Arab-Israeli conflict (formulated in a manner heretofore
unseen in American professional publications and virtually never
disclosed in rather obviously prejudiced popular literature) is pre-
sented to demonstrate that a juridical solution is certainly within the
realm of the possible. Theoretically, the conflict could immediately be
removed from the opposing parties and placed in the context of inter-
national adjudication, with justiciability of the issues almost assured.
As stated previously, the fact that it is not substantiates the proposition
that the issues that lie at the heart of the conflict are not those apparent
issues, but rather psychological and political issues which will be ex-
plored below. Additionally, this discussion will illustrate that even if
these apparent issues are .in fact real, the Arab position is the merito-
rious one.
1. In 1947 the United Nations, as successor to the League of
Nations, decided to partition the "provisionally independent State
of Palestine" into a "Jewish" and "Arab" State.3 By virtue of what
authority did the United Nations assume such a right?4
2. Assuming that the United Nations, under its trusteeship
2 See Bassiouni, Some Legal Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 14 THE ARAB WORLD
41 (special ed. 1968), to be reprinted in The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of 1967 (I.
Abu-Lughod ed. 1970); Wright, Legal Aspects of the Middle East Situation, 33 LAw &
CONTENMP. PROB. 5 (1968).
3 G.A. Res. 181, U.N. Doc. A519 at 131 (1947).
4 See generally E1-Farra, The Role of the U.N. Vis-ti-Vis the Palestine Question, 33
LAW &: ComNa p. PROB. 68 (1968).
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articles, possessed sufficient authority to make such a decision, should
it not have complied with the Palestinian peoples' right to self-deter-
mination as a condition precedent to the partition; and if the people
elected separate States, should not the allocation of territory to each
State have been on the basis of citizenship and property ownership?5
Would the failure to do so render the partition decision void or void-
able?
3. Assuming the legitimacy and validity of the United Nations
action in Palestine, would not Israel's borders be confined to its
allotted partition share? If this position is correct, would not all terri-
tory subsequently acquired by force of arms constitute illegal occupa-
tion and, therefore, violate international law (jus ex injuria non
oritur)?6
4. Does the United Nations have a supervisori duty over the
obligations it imposed upon the creation of Israel, such as the obliga-
tion to repatriate and compensate the Palestinian Arabs, who have
been denied such rights in violation of both international law and
various United Nations resolutions?7
5 See notes 120-S0 and accompanying text infra. It should also be noted that in
1920 the Arab population of Palestine was 90 percent Christian and Moslem and 10 percent
Jewish. By 1930, as a result of increasing British immigration quotas to European Jews,
that segment of the population rose to 19 percent and by 1940, it became 30 percent of a
total population of 1,580,000. By then Great Britian pledged to keep a lid on immigration
so as to maintain a one-third to two-thirds ratio. Between 1940 and 1947, no less than
an estimated 250,000 Jews entered Palestine illegally, i.e., without an immigration visa.
In 1947 the Arab non-Jewish citizens owned all but 12 percent of the registered real
property. These figures appear in DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939
(E. Woodward & R. Butler eds. 1951) and are referred to in W. YALE, THE NEAR EAST
ch. 28 (1958). It is believed, however, that these figures are approximated and not exact.
6 Notwithstanding the figures cited in note 5 supra, the Partition Plan allocated
58 percent of Palestine to Israel. See notes 3-5 supra; Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 42-43.
After the 1948-1949 war, Israel's territorial occupation of Palestine increased by 23
percent, and by 1967 it included all of Palestine and parts of Egypt, Syria and Jordan.
The principle of invalidity of acquisition of territory by force of arms finds its legal
foundation in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1929. See R. FEuELL, PEACE IN THEM TIME
266 (1968); The Fourteen Points of President Woodrow Wilson, in DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 137 (7th ed. 1969); THE INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION ON RICHTS AND
DUTIES OF STATES art. 2; THE DRAFT DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES arts.
9, 10, 11; U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 and specifically S.C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR, 1382d
meeting 8 (1967). See generally Q. WRIHT, THE OUTLAWRY OF WAR AND THE LAW OF WAR
(1953); Wright, The Meaning of the Pact of Paris, 27 Am. J. INT'L L. 39 (1932).
7 The U.N. Charter trusteeship provisions specify in article 79:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner
the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing
international instruments to which members of the United Nations may respec-
tively be parties.
In this context it should be noted that article 5 of the Palestine Mandate provided for
"safeguarding of the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine,
irrespective of race and religion." The Mandate will be discussed subsequently. For a
discussion of British Policy implementing the Mandate, see PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS CM)
No. 1700, at 18 et seq. (1922); CMD No, 1785 (1922); CmD No. 6019, at 2-3 et seq.
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5. If Israel is a legally constituted State by virtue of the United
Nations partition decision, did the Arab States commit aggression
when they attacked Israel in 1948? In the event, however, that the
decision of the United Nations was either without authority or in
violation of international law, was the Arab States' action that of a
third party intervening on behalf of the Palestinian Arabs in the
course of a civil war?s
6. Assuming the validity of the United Nations partition resolu-
tion, did it create the State of Israel proper or was that State created
by its own subsequent declaration of independence? Under the former
interpretation, Israel's borders are limited to the territory allocated
by the United Nations; but under the latter, did Israel become the
state successor of the "provisionally independent State of Palestine,"
thereby freeing itself from any such limitation?9
7. Having subsequently conquered all of the territory of Pales-
tine, would Israel not then, in fact, have become the successor State
of Palestine? ° In this case, would the Palestinian Arabs be entitled to
(1938-1939). See Count Bernadotte's report incorporated into Secretary General Trygve
Lie's report to the Security Council in 2 U.N. SCOR, Supp. 1948, at 103-104. Specifically,
the right of the Palestinians to return and to be compensated was first established in
G.A. Res. 194, U.N. Doc. A1810 at 21 (1948), and has been often reiterated. Israel pledged
implementation of this right to the U.N. Conciliation Commission, and this pledge was
incorporated in the Commission's Lausanne Protocol, 2 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A1927
at 6 (1949).
From 1949 to date, 22 U.N. Resolutions reaffirmed Resolution 194, not including
Res. 242, Nov. 22, 1967, which also mentioned the settlement of the refugee problem.
Israel's admission to the U.N. in 1949 was conditioned upon its compliance with the U.N.
Charter membership requirements which inciude compliance with international obligations.
The Resolutions accepting Israeli membership of May 11, 1949 state in paragraph 4 that
Israel "unreservedly accepts the obligations of the U.N. Charter and undertakes to
honour them from the day when it becomes a member of the U.N." G.A. Res. 273, U.N.
Doc. A/900 at 18 (1949). The Lausanne Protocol was signed the following day to emphasize
Israel's obligations not only as a creation of the U.N., but also as a member of the U.N.
8 For a discussion of third party interventions in civil wars and/or international wars,
see, e.g., R. HULL & I. NOVOGRAD, LAW AND VIET NAM (1968); Moore, International Law and
the United States' Role in Viet Nam: A Reply, 76 YALE L.J. 1051, 1091-93 (1967). Cf. Falk,
International Law and the United States' Role in the Viet Nam War, 75 YALE L.J. 1122,
1154 (1966); Partan, Legal Aspects of the Vietnam Conflict, 46 B.U.L. REv. 281 (1966);
Wright, Legal Aspects of the Viet Nam Situation, 60 Am. J. INT'L L. 750 (1966); Comment,
The United States in Vietnam: A Case Study in the Law of Intervention, 50 CALIF. L. REv.
515 (1962). See also Bassiouni, The War Power and the Law of War: Theory and Realism,
18 DEPAUL L. REv. 188 (1968); Wright, The Concept of Aggression in International Law,
29 Am. J. INT'L L. 373 (1935); Symposium -Legality of United States Participation in the
Viet Nam Conflict, 75 YALE L. J. 1085 (1966).
9. Palestine was the only nation in Class A of the League of Nations' Mandate which
did not receive its independence even though it was referred to in the Mandate as a
"provisionally independent state." See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22 and the
"Mandate" discussed at notes 121-31 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of state
succession, see generally D. O'CONNELL, Tim LAW OF STATE SuccEssioN (1956); L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed. 1955).
10 After the 1967 war, all of Palestine fell under Israeli occupation and the question of
state succession may arise more significantly again. See G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 360-77 (1943); I. HiDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 358-438 (2d ed. 1945). For
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equal citizenship rights in the successor State? Would the denial of these
rights on such a basis constitute a violation of international law?
8. Is Israel entitled to claim a right of free and innocent passage
in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba?" Would that right
accrue to Israel as a State whose borders are limited to the territory
allotted under the partition plan or because it is the successor State
of Palestine? Can that right, depending upon the basis of its existence,
be abridged by a "state of belligerency," or by Israel's violations of
international law, such as the military conquest of additional territory
or its refusal to repatriate and compensate the Palestinian Arabs? Al-
ternatively, is the Gulf of Aqaba an internal waterway possessing
historical characteristics which would not be available to a new state? 2
Is the 1958 Geneva Convention 13 applicable in determining the right
of access to the Gulf and the Straits, regardless of whether Israel is a
lawful riparian nation? Would it apply to a state which acquired ripar-
ian territory by force of arms, or only if Israel is to be considered the
state successor of Palestine? Does the closing of the Straits to Israeli
navigation constitute an act of aggression, a violation of international
law, or a casus belli as Israel claimed in 1967?14
9. The right to free and innocent passage through the Suez Canal
raises questions which again pertain, in part, to the origin of Israel.
As the successor State of Palestine, which was part of the Turkish
Ottoman Empire at the time of the 1888 Constantinople Convention,
Israel is entitled to free and innocent passage, and so are goods directed
to its territory on board other flag-carrying vessels.' 5 However, could
the most recent American position see 2 M. WHrrEMAN, DIGESr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
754-936 (1963). See also A. KEITH, THEORY OF STATE SUCCESSION 5 (1905); D. O'CONNELL,
supra note 9, at 156-69, 571-73; L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 9, at 944-45.
11 See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 49-51; cf. L. BLooMFIELD, EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE
GULF OF AQABA IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (1957); Selak, A Consideration of the Legal
Status of the Gulf of Aqaba, 52 Am. J. INT'L L 660 (1958).
12 For an analogous situation see the case of the Guatemala-Honduras boundary
arbitration of 1933 which involved the Bay of Fonseca. Bay of Fonseca Case (Guatemala-
Honduras), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1307 (1933-1934). A contrary view can be seen in the Corfu
Channel Case, [1949] I.G.J. 28. The Arab position that it is a mare clausum appears in 12
U.N. GAOR 223 (1957). Since 1841, the ports on the Gulf of Aqaba had been recognized
as Egypt's by the Turkish Ottoman Empire and acknowledged by Israel in a Ministry of
Foreign Affairs' publication, BACKGROUND PAPER ON THE GULF OF AQABA 5 (May 1956). The
American position can be found in 36 DEP'T STATE BULL. 482-89 (1957).
13 THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF HIGH SEAS, TERRITORIAL SEA AND CONTIGUOUS ZONES
art. 16, para. 4, recognizes a right to innocent passage. See also art. 14, para. 4, which
states: "Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security of the coastal state." See note 15 infra.
14 The closing of the Gulf of Aqaba in May 1967 was deemed a casus belli by Israel.
See Sharabi, Prelude to War: The Crisis of May-June 1967, 14 THE ARAB-WoRLD 23-29
(special ed. 1968).
15 M. HEFNAWY, LES PROBLEMES CONTEMPORAINS DU CANAL BE SUEz (1953); Bassiouni,
The Nationalization of the Suez Canal and the Illicit Act of International Law, 14 DEPAUL
L. REv. 258 (1965); cf. Dinitz, The Legal Aspects of the Egyptian Blockade of the Suez
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that right be limited to non-strategic goods or abridged by reason of the
existence of a state of belligerency between Egypt and Israel or by
reason of Israel's forceful occupation of Arab territory in violation of
international law and its denial of the Palestinians' rights, which were
enunciated by the United Nations and were in accordance with Human
Rights Conventions and international law in general? If Israel is the
product of its own declaration of independence, rather than the resolu-
tion of the United Nations, and is not deemed the successor State of
Palestine, can it then claim a right to passage under the 1888 Con-
vention? If so, on what legal basis? If the claim is based upon status as
a third-party beneficiary, for whose benefit was the right to passage
stipulated (even though Israel did not exist at the time)?,
10. The United Nations condemned Israel for its attack against
Egypt in 1956. Was Egypt subsequently authorized to prohibit passage
of Israeli or Israeli-bound vessels through the Tiran Straits and the
Canal? Was Israel guilty of aggression in 1967,17 and what legal con-
sequences derive from its policy of preemptive attack?
11. Is Israel's continued occupation of territory beyond the 1947
partition lines a continuous violation of international law and a con-
dition of permanent aggression?' s Does Israel's continued violation of
the rights of the Palestinian Arabs have the same effect?19 And finally
do such actions activate the Palestinians' rights to self-defense and
Canal, 45 GEo. UJ. 175 (1956). The American position is indicated in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
THE SuEz CANAL PROBLEM 16-19 (1956). See also the Egyptian Embargo Act of Feb. 6, 1950,
which did set forth the basis for searching and seizing material destined to aid Israel's
strategic war potential and which relied upon article 10 of the 1888 Constantinople
Convention. This allowed Egypt to take measures to insure its own safety, and is
discussed in Bassiouni, supra at 266-88. See also Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 47-49.
16 See Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 288-329 and supra note 2, at 5-6; cf. Wright, supra
note 2 at, 20-22. See also Report of the Committee on Use of International Rivers and
Canals, I.L.A. Hamburg, at 58 (1960); L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 9, at 926-927.
17 The contention was made at the Security Council, See 22 U.N. SCOR, 1347th
meeting 17-21 (1967); see also Res. 242 (1967) which ordered Israel's withdrawal from
occupied territory; notes 18, 24 infra.
18 The question remains unresolved by Res. 242 (1967); but, it states:
Emphasizing
The inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war .... (1) withdrawal of
Israeli armed forces territories occupied in the recent conflict.
However, Moshe Dayan has stated:
Our fathers had reached the frontiers which were recognized in the Partition
Plan. Our generation reached the frontiers of 1949. Now the Six-Day Generation
has managed to reached Suez, Jordan and the Golan Heights. This is not the end.
After the present cease-fire lines, there will be new ones. They will extent beyond
Jordan -perhaps to Lebanon and perhaps to central Syria as well.
The Times (London), June 25, 1969, at 1, col. 1. For a discussion of the Resolution see
Bassiouni, The Middle East in Transition: From War to War, 4 INT'L LAw 379 (1970).
See also Levie, The Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement, 50 &1. J. INTL L. 880
(1956).
19 See note 7 supra.
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the rights of neighboring States to collective self-defense under the
United Nations Charter and general principles of international law.20
12. The partition plan contemplated an internationalized Jeru-
salem with free access for all faiths.2 ' Did the Jordanian occupation of
Old Jerusalem from 1948 until 1967 constitute a violation of inter-
national law? Did Israel's 1967 annexation of the same territory and
its refusal to heed subsequent United Nations resolutions condemning
this action also constitute a violation of international law?22 Would a
doctrine of better title be applied? In that case, would the result not
depend on the "clean hands" of the party seeking equity under the
International Court of Justice's exacquo et bono?
13. Does Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, commanding (the
word commanding can be at issue since there is disagreement on
whether or not this resolution is recommendatory or resolutory) Israel's
withdrawal from territory occupied in that conflict include all terri-
tory? Must the withdrawal be accomplished prior to any guarantees of
secured and recognized borders for Israel, or is the resolution uncon-
ditional and peremptory? In the latter case, Israel would be in viola-
tion of this United Nations resolution in particular and of interna-
tional law in general, since territory acquired by force is invalid and
illegitimate.23 If Israel is to comply with the resolution, would its
return to pre-1967 lines sanction these lines as the permanent borders
of its legitimate territory, or would that still be in issue?24
14. Could Israel's claim to be the political institution representing
the "Jewish people," in violation of accepted principles of nationality
status under international law, be considered an act of subversion
against those countries having "nationals" of the Jewish faith?25 Could
Israeli-sponsored attempts to induce such nationals to abandon their
citizenship in favor of Israel, coupled with its claim of representation,
constitute a subversive condition amounting to indirect aggression
against such nations and, in view of this in-gathering policy, a per-
manent threat to Israel's neighboring States?
15. Does the effective deprivation of the Palestinian peoples'
rights, including their right to return, to be compensated, to live and
20 See note 8 supra. U.N. CHARTER arts. 50-51; S. BowEr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1958).
21 G.A. Res. 304, U.N. Doc. A/1251 at 12 (1949); G.A. Res. 194, U.N. Doc. A/810
at 21-23 (1948).
22 G. A. Res. 2258, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 1 at 4, U.N. Doc. A/6798 (1967) (Emer.
Sess. V) (by a vote of 116-0-2).
23 For a discussion of Resolution 242, see Bassiouni, supra note 18.
24 See Levie, supra note 18.
25 See notes 36-67 and accompanying text infra.
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organize on territory allotted them by the United Nations in 1947, in
addition to violating United Nations resolutions,26 Human Rights
Conventions, 27 and international law in general, constitute a violation
of the 1948 Genocide Convention?
16. Does the avowed propaganda of some Arab news media,
promising the annihilation or destruction of Israel by its neighboring
Arab States, coupled with their military alliances, offensive armaments,
and military preparedness constitute direct aggression, or to a lesser
degree, indirect aggression,28 or conspiracy to commit genocide in
violation of Genocide Conventions?29 Does it justify Israel's preemp-
tive and reprisal policies?
PSYCHO-POLrricAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE CONFLICT
As previously noted, the most startling observation which arises
from even a cursory examination of the conflict is that the facts giving
rise to these issues are, for the most part, uncontroverted. 30 This is rather
unique in the history of modern conflicts, although certainly many
secondary facts are disputed. Arguments are made with respect to the
actual number of pre-1967 Palestinian Arabs and Jews, the number of
legal and illegal Jewish immigrants between 1936 and 1947, and the
number of Palestinian Arab refugees after the 1948 and 1967 wars.
Claims of initial aggression and reprisals are also a matter of factual
contention. However, these arguments are not material to the formula-
tion of the issues proper. Thus, while the lack of a fact-finding process
has been one of international law's most glaring weaknesses, it has not
been one of the factors in this conflict. The parties admit the material
facts and are, therefore, in agreement with them - even though only by
implication. Furthermore, the United Nations has maintained a close
fact-finding operation from the inception of the problem in 1947. 31
20 See notes 5 & 6 supra.
27 See THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS COVENANT, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/555, at 71 (1948).
28J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1958). For a discussion of
propaganda and its effects, see J. WHrrroN & A. LARSON, PROPAGANDA: TowARDs DIS-
ARIMAMENT IN THE WAR OF WoR.DS (1964); Symposium -International Control of Propa-
ganda, 31 LAw & CONTEMTP. PROB. 437 (1966).
29 E.g., the Genocide Convention of 1948.
ao See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
31 An Ad Hoc Commission formed in 1947 filed several reports with the U.N.
Secretary General and the General Assembly, among them 2 U.N. GAOR, at 209, U.N.
Doc. A/AC/13/32. Count Bernadotte was dispatched by the U.N. in 1948 and reported
to the Secretary General on September 19, 1948. Many reports followed, including some
by his successor Ralph Bunche. See reports by the U.N. Conciliation Commission work
in Switzerland in 1948, the Jordan Waters Commission, the Mixed Armistice Commission
following the 1949 Rhodes Armistice under U.N. auspices, the United Nations Emergency
1970]
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Jurists will readily recognize that, notwithstanding its limitations,
international law has formulated a sufficient legal framework for a
juridically based resolution of the issues raised by this conflict. Conse-
quently, one must question why such a juridically based solution has
not been found.32 The authors submit that the reason why no viable
alternative to the use of force has been offered, or, if proposed, has
not been adopted, is because the underpinnings of the conflict are
psycho-political rather than legal. This article proposes to explore
these psycho-political underpinnings, in order to gain a better under-
standing of their effect on the prospects of peaceful resolution.
The crux of these psycho-political differences lies in the view that
Israel is the fulfillment of the first stage of the Zionist dream of Eretz
Israel. The in-gathering of all the Jews to reestablish the "Jewish
people" on the "land of Israel," in fulfillment of the prophecy and in
keeping with the divine covenant, is to be implemented by a strong
State capable of insuring the safety of its people and attaining their
political, religious, spiritual, and cultural goals. Unfortunately, the
Zionist leaders chose to build this State on what they understandably
claimed as ancestral territory - in total disregard of what had come to
be, in over 13 centuries, the land of the Arabs.
Palestine, as part of the Arab land, plays a much greater role than
that of being mere real estate. It is the geopolitical link of the "Arab
nation" - an equally political concept, also resting on historical argu-
ments, but much more realistic and natural to the area and its indig-
enous population. Arab nationalist secularism is not as well formulated,
dogmatically or ideologically, as Zionism, but that is because it requires
less artificial dogmatic formulation. It is predicated on the historical
unity of the Islamic nation, which was founded by the Arab people
in the seventh century (Palestine became part of it in 640 A.D.) and
united by the universalism of Islam.33 The aspirations of the Arab
people are currently linked by common modern experiences, language,
religion, culture and, to a large extent, future political expectations.
The geographic continuity of the Arab States is a political and eco-
Forces after 1956 and the cease-fire line observers after 1967. U.N. Secretary General
U Thant made several trips to the area and reported twice to the Security Council on
May 19 and 26. For a discussion of these reports see C. VON HORN, SOLDIERING FOR PEcE
127-40 (1967). See also Anabtawi, The United Nations and the Middle East Conflict of
1967, 14 THE ARAB WORLD 53-60 (special ed. 1968).
32 This author, as Chairman Pro-Tern of an Ad-Hoc Commission composed of eighteen
professors of international law, made such a proposal which was presented to the members
of the U.N. Security Council.
33 Bassiouni, Islam: Concept, Law and World Habeas Corpus, 2 RuToGRs-CA.MD-N
L. REv. 160 (1969).
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nomic factor which also militates in favor of these regional aspirations.
Thus far, however, the political basis of these future aspirations is
undefined and thereby constitutes what is probably the most significant
impediment to Arab expectations. To that extent, the present conflict
over Israel is its most binding element; yet, it is clear that Israel is not
the raison d'tre of Arab nationalism but merely its contemporary
catalyst.
The central issue underlying the entire conflict, then, is Zionism
versus Arab nationalism. The two doctrines are, in their original form,
irreconcilable. It is this conflict of concepts which explains why no
juridically-based solution has been adopted. Neither side has been
willing to alter its ideological course. Arabs and Zionists are suspicious
and fearful of each other, and coexistence cannot be envisioned by
either as long as such positions are maintained. Thus, in addition to
the very nature of the ideological conflict, derivative psychological
factors must also be considered. These factors are varied, and can be
said to have their roots in mutual fear and distrust. Lately, however,
there has evolved the conviction that the destruction of the opposite
ideology is essential. Both sides now regard this as an objective because
their popularized social psychology is impregnated with the conviction
that if one ideology is bent on the destruction of the other, the sur-
vival of either can be insured only by the preemptive destruction of
the other. In other words, as Mr. Eban aptly referred to it (but only
one-sidedly), each side is bent on "politicide" (to say the least). The
initial respective claims of righteousness and legality are now replaced
by rationalizations of survival and self-preservation, at which point
logic, reason and law fade away behind allegedly justifiable extremism.
To understand the present stage of the situation and to explore its
future, we must first examine these underlying factors which support
and fuel the conflict at present, and thereby affect its future develop-
ment.
Recent events in the Middle East underscore the failure of the
governments and peoples of most Western countries to understand
or even recognize the true nature of the conflict between Israel and
her adversaries. This struggle began more than 50 years ago between
the Arabs of Palestine and Zionist Jews. Powerfully aided by the
Western powers, the Zionists were determined to restore Palestine to
the status it had once enjoyed for a brief time: an independent Jewish
State. The recent emergence of a rapidly coalescing Palestine liberation
movement, planned, led, and carried forward by Palestinians, demon-
strates that the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to bear the imprint
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of its original form - a bitter war between a people who had inhabited
Palestine continuously for more than 1300 years and those who would
deny the Palestinians their claim to nationhood or their national
right to self-determination. 34 When this basic conflict between con-
tending claims of nationhood and nationality - that of the Palestinians
seeking the reestablishment of their State and that of a "Jewish people"
claiming sovereignty, to the exclusion of the Arab Palestinians in
particular and non-Jews in general, in a "national home" -is at last
resolved, other issues between Israel and the Arab States (most of which
derive from this central issue) can be expected to wither into relative
insignificance and virtually certain peaceful resolution.
To understand the Palestinian claim to nationhood, we must first
study the validity of the Jewish claim to nationhood and sovereignty
within the same disputed territory.
The basis for such a scheme of study rests upon the fact that
Palestine existed before Israel (1948). Correlatively, it is the Palestinian
people who are presently dispossessed of a homeland they are now seek-
ing to recover, by force of arms if necessary, against those who claim a
superior right. The surrounding Arab States are only secondary parties
to that issue and are, therefore, only derivatively involved as third-party
intervenors.
One must be mindful of the very significant fact that Zionism is
an international doctrine of which Israelism and Judaism are but con-
stitutive factors. Conversely, Arab nationalist secularism is indigenous
and regional. While the former political doctrine draws support from
its international base, the latter remains local. Opportunities for foreign
intervention in the conflict have, since its inception, resulted from
the international character of Zionism, which has been able to attract
foreign support. In contrast, the search by the Arabs for foreign support
was a reaction to that of the Zionists and, as such, was belated. Simi-
84 The Israeli position on this subject is manifested by its leaders' positions.
Asked whether the Palestinians were not also entitled to their homeland, Premier
Levi Eshkol answered: "What are the Palestinians?"
NEwsWEEK, Feb. 17, 1969, at 18.
Asked about the role of the Palestinians in any future peace settlement, Foreign
Minister Abba Eban said: "They have no role to play."
Le Monde, Jan. 20, 1969, at 2, col. 3.
The Palestinians "are not a party to the conflict between Israel and the Arab
states." Ruling by the Israeli Military Court at Ramallah.
Jewish Observer, April 18, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
There was no such thing as Palestinians. . . It was not as though there was a
Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we
came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not
exist.
Statement by Golda Meir, The Times (London), June 15, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
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larly, the Arabs were forced to turn to those who, for other reasons,
opposed the solicited supporters of Israel. Thus the entry of this con-
flict into the "cold war" was caused by Israel's successful polarization
policy, which allied the Western powers to it and effectively compelled
Arab alignment with anti-Western nations.
THE JEWISH PEOPLE QUESTION: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, HISTORICAL, AND
LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF ITS NATIONALITY CLAIM AND PALESTINE
The claim for the existence of a "Jewish people" as a legally and
juridically recognizable entity rests primarily on the historical, reli-
gious, and sociological background of the Jews in Palestine and on the
premise (widely accepted in Western lands) that these factors entitle Jews
of diverse national origins to establish and maintain a sovereign State in
Palestine. The claim presupposes the continuous existence of a Jewish
nationality group deriving from Jewish history in Palestine, notwith-
standing the individual assumption of various nationalities by its
claimed membership over the centuries. To understand this claim, a
knowledge of that history is required.
Recorded Palestinian history is rooted in the Old Testament of
the Bible, although modern research has produced supplementary
knowledge. Arabs migrating from Yemen had settled in Palestine as
early as 3500 B.C.,35 while the Hebrews, led by Moses, came there
2,000 years later. The first Hebrew kingdom was established by King
David circa 1010-970 B.C., and the chief symbol of Hebrew culture
and thought has always been the temple built by David's son, Solo-
mon, in Jerusalem circa 970-980 B.C.3 6 Although at one point Hebrew
rule extended as far as the borders of Egypt and Assyria, before David
and after Solomon no central government exercised undisputed do-
minion over Palestine (the kingdom of David and Solomon lasted only
about 70 years).
In 65 B.C., Roman legions seized Jerusalem, and thereafter, until
1948 A.D., there was no independent Jewish rule in Palestine. For
seven centuries Palestine remained a Roman, then Byzantine province.
From 640 A.D. until 1948, the country was wholly Arab in character,
history and tradition. Palestine existed as part of the nation of Islam,
and although it remained subject to the political control of the Otto-
man Empire for over 600 years, it preserved and maintained its local
character as an Arab country.
3 A. NUTTING, THE ARABS ch. 7 (1965).
36 Tibawi, Jerusalem: Its Place in Islam and Arab History, 14 THE ARAB WoRu.i
9-22 (special ed. 1968).
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After the Romans destroyed Jerusalem in 135 A.D., successive
waves of Jewish emigration swelled the Jewish communities in Egypt
and Mesopotamia, flowed into Syria, and moved across the Mediter-
ranean to Greece. Another wave followed the Arab conquest in 640
A.D., as the Jews resettled in North Africa and Iberia. It is especially
significant that Jews in all Arab-ruled countries accepted assimilation
into the Arab nation (as Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion conceded
in interviews with American newsmen in 1964) 37 and yet preserved
their religious affiliation. The Muslim Arabs practiced a degree of
religious tolerance which was unmatched in the Western world until
the advent of the French Revolution; Jews and Christians were per-
mitted to practice their religious creeds while enjoying the civic,
political, and economic benefits of citizenship. In sharp contrast, an
era of Christian persecution of the Jews followed the downfall of
Moslem rule in Spain. Those Jews who survived the Grand Inquisition
without converting to Christianity, either retreated to Arab North
Africa or sought refuge in Central Europe. However, those adopting
the latter course quickly discovered that the religious freedom available
to their co-religionists in the Arab world was unavailable in Europe.
They were driven into walled ghettos by Pope Paul IV, a practice
which was to be frequently adopted by other European rulers. Indeed,
the vicious brutality of the treatment imposed upon European Jews
during the Middle Ages shocks the modern mind, and one marvels that
any survived. No figures can be cited with certainty, but scholarly
estimates indicate that there were approximately four million Jews in
the world in the early years of the Diaspora and only about one and a
half million by 1700.38
After the French and American Revolutions introduced new con-
cepts of individual rights to the world community, Judaism began
to flourish again. Yet, in many areas, particularly Eastern Europe,
persecution continued. Even in the Western countries, Jews remained
the victims of social and economic discrimination, the spread of anti-
Jewishness 39 culminating in the Dreyfus case. 40 Similarly, the frequent
pogroms and massacres in Russia continued to demonstrate that the
status of Jews was still insecure, their safety and well-being remaining
37 Moskin, Prejudice in Israel, LooK, Oct. 5, 1965, at 127.
38 ROYAL PALESTINE COMsMISSION REPORT ch. 1, 26 (1937) [hereinafter ROYAL
COMM.].
39 Use of the word "anti-semitism" is purposely avoided; Semites include Arabs, and
just as Arabs cannot be anti-semites, it is believed that, since Europe had no Arab
minorities living therein, her experience was with Jews and the discrimination anti-
Jewish oriented.
40 See note 13 supra.
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in jeopardy; and in Eastern Europe, conditions continued to resemble
markedly those which existed in medieval times. In those lands of
continuing oppression, large scale emigration seemed to offer Jews
their brightest hope. Accordingly, huge majorities of migrating Jews
turned to the West, particularly Great Britain and the United States.
However, some did "return" to Palestine; while there were some
12,000 Jews in that land in 1845, this number increased to 80,000 in
1914, the difference due, in large part, to European immigrants.
41
Zionists vigorously contend that throughout 18 centuries of dis-
persion, Jews everywhere nourished a memory of, and prayed for
return to, a Palestine homeland. Nevertheless, history raises serious
doubts as to this claim, and indicates that their attachment to Pales-
tine was religious, spiritual, and perhaps even cultural (even though
strong Arab influence makes it unseemly), rather than political or
temporal. A continuing spiritual attachment to the birthplace of their
religious faith cannot be denied, but desire for a physical return there
is historically doubtful. In the Arab countries, as we have noted, Jews
were thoroughly Arabized. To cite one example, Maimonides (Moshe
ben Maimon) served as court physician to the famed Salah-El-Din
(Saladin) and wrote his still revered Commentary on the Mishma and
Book of Commandments in Arabic at Fostat, a suburb of Cairo. Simi-
larly, many Jews served as the ambassadors of Muslim rulers and
occupied other high government posts throughout the history of the
Islamic nations. Jews taught at Arab universities, pursued advanced
study in medicine, science, history, and philosophy, and wrote freely
concerning both sacred and secular subjects. Indeed, a century before
Prophet Muhammad's time, a Himyarite Arab ruler at Sa'nda, Dhu
Nuwas, adopted Judaism and took his people into that faith with
him.4
Russian Jews appear to have kept the story of a Jewish homeland
in Palestine glowing as a beacon of hope, but it seems unlikely that
they had any direct historical or ancestral link with the birthplace of
Judaism. History has recorded no mass migration of Jews to Russia.
Rather, Russian Jews seem to have descended from the Khazars, a
Turkish-speaking people who once ruled southern Russia. About 800
A.D., a Khazar king, along with his subjects, converted to the Jewish
faith,43 and although the Khazars subsequently relinquished their po-
litical power to the Muscovites, they continued to cling to their reli-
41 RoYAL CoM. at 9, 19.
42 A. Nutrrwc, supra note 35, at 24.
43 D. DUNLOP, HISToRY OF Tim JEwisH KAzA (1954).
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gious faith, keeping it alive until modern times. Significantly, how-
ever, the Khazar Jews had no access to learning after their fall from
power. Even the history and the laws of Judaism were preserved almost
entirely in oral tradition, and it is extremely likely that Russian Jews
of the 19th century knew little or nothing of their actual ethnic
origin. In such circumstances, the natural tendency was to identify
themselves with all other followers of Judaism, their brethren in faith,
and to believe in an ancestral link with Palestine which did not in
fact exist.
The yearning of Eastern European Jewry for a better, brighter
future promoted a sense of Jewish nationalism in which Palestine-
Zion - was the goal. Branches of a new nationalist movement, Hoveve
Zion (Love of Zion), began to appear in Eastern Europe during the
late 1800's. This was the origin of the Zionist movement, which
achieved wide notice and international attention when Theodor Herzl,
angry and bitter over the flagrant injustice of the Dreyfus case in 1894,
wrote his pamphlet, Der Juden Staat (The Jewish State)4 4 contending
that only a sovereign Jewish nation capable of dealing with other na-
tions on a basis of equality could protect Jewish rights throughout the
world.
From the anger and indignation aroused by both the Dreyfus
affair 5 and Herzl's works, there came into existence a new World
Zionist Organization established at Basel, Switzerland, in 1897. With
Herzl as its first international president, the group set, as its prime
objective, the creation for the "Jewish people" of a Palestinian home
secured by public law.-6 Herzl saw in the World Zionist Organization
a symbolic embodiment of the sovereign will of the "Jewish people," a
kind of government in exile of the Jewish State which he hoped to help
establish. Despite his belief that such a body could win international
recognition as the accepted representative of the "Jewish people," this
task was virtually insurmountable at that time. The primary obstacle
was the Organization's contention that it represented a constituency
scattered throughout the world, whose members had long since ac-
quired full citizenship in the States they inhabited, and who had no
interest whatsoever in a program designed to establish for them a
44 Der Juden Staat, published originally in Vienna in 1894, has been republished in
many languages and is still in print. T. HERZL, THE JEWISH STATE: AN ATTEMPT AT A
MODERN SOLUTION OF THE JEWISH QUESTION (S. D'Avigor & A. Cohen transl. 1943).
45 In 1894, a French military court sentenced Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a Jew, to life
imprisonment for treason. His conviction was based on the testimony of gentile fellow
officers who committed perjury to protect a gentile aristocrat. Theodor Herzl reported
the trial for Neue Freie Presse of Vienna.
46 See note 11 supra.
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new national status or identity based solely upon the fact of their
Jewishness.
In terms of contemporary nationality law, the Zionist claim to
represent a Jewish nation, in which every Jew is and remains a de facto
natural citizen, until he claims it de jure is unprecedented, without
legal foundation in international law, and difficult to sustain. Although
citizenship is a question of municipal law, the competence to con-
stitute a nationality entity and to confer membership in it, while
emanating from municipal law, is nonetheless limited by international
law.47 The constituting authority must be a State, and the constituted
entity must be the nationality of that State, as conferred by the former
to a juridical subject whose links with the conferring state warrant the
grant of nationality.48 Even a sovereign State lacks unrestricted power
to confer nationality.49 There must be a factual connection or "genuine
link" between the individual and the State which attempts to confer
nationality, with its legally binding and enforceable duties and obli-
gations upon him. This mutuality of citizen-state obligations was well
expressed in the case of Lurie v. United States:50 "Citizenship is mem-
bership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the
part of the member and a duty of protection on the part of the society.
These are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the
other."R1 Accordingly, statehood differs from nationhood, in that the
former is predicated on a political concept subject to the regulation of
international law, while the latter is a label for an association predi-
cated on factors other than juridicial. Only a State, then, can confer
nationality, subject to the limitations of international law.
47 "Nationality Law is closely connected with the political structure of a country..
It determines who shall be a 'citizen' and thus what shall be the composition of the
'nation.'" Silving, Nationality in Comparative Law, 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 410 (1956). "The
competence to constitute a nationality entity and confer membership in it is
limited by law. The juridical limitations are as applicable to the Jewish people nationality
claims as to any others." Mallison, The Zionist-Israel Juridical Claims to Constitute "the
Jewish People" Nationality Entity and to Confer Membership in It. Appraisals in Public
International Law, 32 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 983, 1050 (1964). See also L. OPPENHEIm, supra
note 9, at 645. See also The Times-Morocco Nationality Decrees [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. B,
No. 4; The Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws, April 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S.
89; Koessler, Subject, Citizen, National and Permanent Allegiance, 56 YALE LJ. 58, 65-75
(1946); McGovney, Our Non-Citizen Nationals, Who Are They?, 22 CALIF. L. Ray. 593
(1934); Note, Developments in the Law -Immigration and Nationality, 66 H.Av. L. Rv.
643, 703-04 (1953).
48 See also M. PANHUYS, THE ROLE OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959);
Mallison & Koessler, Rights and Duties of Declarant Aliens, 91 U. PA. L. REv. 321
(1942); Harvard Research in International Law, Nationality, 23 Ams. J. INT'L L. 11 (special
supp. 1929).
49 See notes 47 and 48 supra and note 52 infra.
50 231 U.S. 9 (1913); see also note 57 infra.
51231 U.S. at 22.
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Organized Zionism prior to the creation of the State of Israel was
not in any sense the type of "State" contemplated by public law, and
until the establishment of Israel, there was no "political society" con-
stituted as a State which was capable of granting "Jewish" nationality.
In regard to the second requirement, various factors are to be con-
sidered in determining the existence of a "genuine link" between an
existing State and those upon whom it seeks to confer nationality, and
the nature of those factors will determine their significance. Habitual
residence is one such factor; others include the center of individual
interests, family ties, participation in public life, service in the military
forces of the conferring country, attachment to the interests of a given
State as manifested by cultural conduct, and declaration of the indi-
vidual's intentions.52 Furthermore, the sentiments forming the link
must be secular; religious attachment alone is not enough, for if that
factor, without more, was regarded as sufficient, the procedure would
be discriminatory, and as such, of internationally enunciated human
rights.
Application of these criteria to the "Jewish people" issue is dif-
ficult, but we believe that on the facts, they support the following
findings:
1. The only States capable of conferring Jewish nationality were
the ancient Hebrew States in Palestine and their successor
States, whenever bound by the obligations thus created.
2. Only those Jews who have maintained the effective link be-
tween themselves and the ancient Hebrew states by success-
fully resisting assimilation into another nationality have not
52 Lichtenstein v. Guatemala, (Nottebohm Case) [19 5 5] I.C.J. 4. Genuine link includes
the following requirements: (a) some social basis both in an objective sense in terms of
tangible interest and a subjective sense in terms of sentiments to ideals, cultural and
perhaps religious attachment; and (b) reciprocal rights and duties between the individual
and the state. Hence, the basis utilized in countries such as Israel, Red China and Russia,
where citizenship can be granted only on ideological grounds, would not be sufficient
to be recognized under international law. The main arguments advanced by the court
in favor of the "genuine link" requirement are: (1) its use in cases of dual nationality; (2)
the definition of nationality by third states as a legal bond having as its basis a social
fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together
with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties; (3) the writing of publicist; (4) the
tendency of nationality laws which make naturalization dependent on conditions indicating
the existence of a link; (5) the practice of certain states to refrain from exercising
protection in favor of a naturalized person when the latter has, in fact, severed his
links with his new country (Bancroft treaties); and (6) the existence of article 5 of the
Hague Convention (1930) which called for a genuine link. Hence, the court derived
from custom and general principles the added requirement, beyond naturalization by a
state, of a "genuine link" between that state and the individual to whom it wishes to
afford diplomatic protection. The case was discussed in Kunz, The Nottebohm Judgment,
54 Am. J. INT'L L. 536 (1960).
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abandoned their citizenship in those ancient states, and thus,
in the successor States. Every Jew who participated in the pub-
lic life of any other State, swore allegiance to such a state, or
by some other positive act, exercised the rights of citizenship
in such a State at any time since the original conferring or
adoption of nationality in one of the ancient Hebrew states,
must be held to have abandoned his Jewish nationality for
himself and his children. This would seem to exclude prac-
tically all modem Jews from any contemporary Jewish na-
tionality status.
3. Those Jews whose direct ancestors were never members of
the nationality group represented by the ancient Hebrew States
have never enjoyed Jewish nationality, and therefore, could
not be members of a continuing "Jewish people" in any po-
litical sense. This conclusion would apply specifically to the
Jewish IKhazars of Russia and to the Jews of Yemen.5 3
This'restrictive view of the "Jewish people" question is vigorously
contested by the Zionists, who maintain an open-ended concept of
Zionism and thus, of Jewish nationality status. This concept, which
finds its clearest expression in the Israeli Law of Return,54 enjoyed its
most telling victory when Israel secured reparations from West Ger-
many for German acts against all European Jews, regardless of their
nationality, even though the State of Israel did not exist at the time
of those acts (1939-1945).
Zionists contend that no Jew has ever broken the effective link
because the people of the Diaspora were exiled from Palestine by force,
and were prevented from returning. Hence, the Zionists claim that
any prescriptive loss of nationality would be unconscionable. How-
ever, this view ignores the fact that after the Arab conquest in 640
A.D., the Arab rulers of Palestine rescinded the Roman decree of ex-
clusion against Jews, and that some Jews of the Diaspora did indeed
take up residence in the country. 5 For these very few, the Zionist claim
of a continuing Jewish nationality would certainly have to be ac-
knowledged. But for the enormous majority of Jews who accepted the
53 See notes 42 and 43 supra.
54 In 1950, the Israeli Knesset (parliament) enacted a "Law of Return," which
recognizes every Jewish immigrant as a full citizen as of the moment of his arrival and
confers upon him the right to exercise all the functions of citizenship forthwith. This
will be discussed further in note 62 infra. For a critical discussion of the practical
application of this law, see Galanter, A Dissent on Brother Daniel, Co f.NTA.'Y, July
1963, at 10-17.
55 See Tibawi, supra note 36.
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rights and obligations of nationality in other States after Palestine was
reopened to them, the Zionist claim would appear to possess no validity.
As intimated previously, the Zionist claim of a continuing Jewish
nationality poses significant problems of dual nationality, especially
for Jews in the United States. That issue is beyond the scope of this
article, but it may be proper to mention here the principal question
thus raised: Can a Jewish American claim the Jewish nationality that
Zionism contends he possesses (even though he does not, in fact, assert
it), and at the same time, remain compatible with those citizenship
obligations imposed by the Constitution and laws of the United
States?56 For those who do not claim or accept Israeli offers of citizen-
ship, there is no conflict. As to those who do not refuse or repudiate
the offer, but subjectively further its purposes by monetary contribu-
tions, political allegiance, and other forms of support, the question
is at least open to exploration.5 7
56 The issue of dual nationality, especially as it affects U.S. citizens, continues to
present problems. David Ben-Gurion, former prime minister of Israel, defined Zionist
loyalty to Israel in these terms: "The basis of Zionism is neither friendshhip nor
loyalty but the love of Israel, of the State of Israel .... It must be an unconditional love.
There must be a complete solidarity with the state and the people of Israel." Address by
David Ben-Gurion before the Action Committee, World Zionist Organization, in Jerusalem,
April 25, 1950, in A. LILIENTHAL, THE OTHER SIE OF THE COIN 76 (1965). Nahum
Goldmann, President of the World Zionist Organization, has said "American Jews must
have the courage to openly declare that they entertain a double loyalty, one to the land
in which they live and one to Israel. Jews should not succumb to patriotic talk that they
owe allegiance only to the land in which they live." Jewish Daily Forward, Jan. 9, 1959.
57 See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), which overruled Perez v. Brownell, 356
U S. 44 (1957), and held that expatriation must be based upon the voluntary relinquishment
of nationality as manifested by the intent of the party. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion
supports the Perez holding on the ground that Congress has the power to decide what
conduct is deemed in "derogation of undivided allegiance to this country." 356 U.S.
at 68. The majority, by implication, would hold that finding a breach of allegiance is an
offense under American law but not sufficient to warrant expatriation in the absence of a
showing of intent. The Justice Department maintains the attitude that for administrative
purposes, and until the courts have clarified the scope of Afroyim, the Nationality Act of
1940 continues to be held applicable and that voluntary relinquishment of citizenship is
not confined to a written renunciation, as under section 349 (a) (6), (7) of the Act. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1481 (a)(6),(7) (1964). But it can also be manifested by other actions declared expatriative
under the Act, if such actions are in derogation of allegiance to this country, even if in
those instances Afroyim leaves it open to the individual to raise the issue of intent.
The burden of proof of such intent is on the party asserting it. Ajroyim suggests that this
burden is not easily satisfied by the Government. In Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129
(1958), Mr. Justice Black had stated that the voluntary performance of some acts can "be
highly persuasive evidence in the particular case of a purpose to abandon citizenship."
Id. at 139 (concurring opinion). Yet some kinds of conduct, though within the proscription
of the statute, simply will not be sufficiently probative to support a finding of voluntary
expatriation. In each case the administrative authorities must make a judgment, based on
all the evidence, whether the individual comes within the terms of an expatriation
provision' and has in fact voluntarily relinquished his citizenship. The principles of
Afroyim reach and, therefore, include all of sections 349(a) and 350 of the Act, insofar
as it relates to dual nationals born or naturalized in the United States, and section 405(c)
insofar as it purports to continue the effectiveness of individual losses of nationality under
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Zionists argue that their concept of a continuing "Jewish people"
throughout the history of mankind, as predicated on the notion of the
"chosen people," was implicitly recognized in the Balfour Declara-
tion. This view completely ignores one very important provision of
the Declaration: "It being clearly understood that nothing shall be
done which may prejudice the ... rights and political status of Jews
in any other country."58s This provision was specifically designed to
avoid the juridical and political consequences of open-ended Zionism,
which the mandatory powers contemplated with apprehension.59
The concept of a subjective Jewish nation, existing through more
than 19 centuries without territory, government, or political con-
tinuity, and imposing obligations and limitations upon all adherents
of the Jewish religious faith, regardless of ethnic origin, choice of
nationality or time of conversion to Judaism (or for that matter con-
tinued adherence to Judaism), has no foundation or precedent in any
recognized legal doctrine. The United States has specifically and ex-
pressly rejected it, as is evidenced by a letter dated April 20, 1964 and
addressed to Rabbi Elmer Berger (then executive vice president of the
American Council for Judaism), wherein Assistant Secretary of State
Phillips Talbot officially asserted:
The Department of State recognizes the State of Israel as a sover-
eign State and citizenship of the State of Israel. It recognizes no
other sovereignty or citizenship in connection therewith. It does
not recognize a legal-political relationship based upon the religious
identification of American citizens .... Accordingly, it should be
the similar provisions of sections 401 and 404 of the Nationality Act of 1940. See also
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Perri v. Dulles, 280 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1956); In re
Becher, I. & N. Dec., interim decision No. 1771 (Att'y Gen. 1967); Speer, The Place of
Foreign Law in Expatriation Cases, 4 INT'L LAW 139 (1969).
58 See L. STEIN, THE BAu~ouR DEcr.ATIoN app. IV (1961).
59A decision of mandatory powers including the United States was made on April
25, 1920
to accept the terms of the mandates' article as given below with reference to
Palestine on the understanding that there was inserted in the proces-verbal an
undertaking by the mandatory powers that this would not involve the surrender
of the rights hitherto enjoyed by the non-Jewish communities in Palestine.
For a discussion of the viewpoint that the nationality of native inhabitants of the
mandated territories is definitely different from that of the nationals of the Mandatory
Power, see G. HALL, MANDATES, DEPENDENCIES AND TusTEF- Hips 77-80 (1948); L. OPPENHKEI,
supra note 9, at 220-22; Goldie, Wong Man On v. Commonwealth of Australia, I INT'L
& Comp. L.Q. 557 (1952); Wright, Status of the Inhabitants of Mandated Territory, 1S
A .J. INT'L L. 306 (1924). While most of the trusteeship agreements concluded by the
United Nations are silent as to the nationality of the inhabitants of the trust territories,
the trusteeship agreement for the former Japanese mandated islands provides in article
11 that the United States, as administering authority, "shall take the necessary steps to
provide the status of citizenship of the Trust Territory for the inhabitants of the Trust
Territory." Trusteeship Agreement for Japanese Mandated Islands, July 18, 1947 T.I.A.S.
No. 1665, 8 U.N.T.S. 181.
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dear that the Department of State does not regard the "Jewish
people" concept as a concept of international law.60
Professor W. T. Mallison, Jr., one of the foremost authorities on this
subject, proposes recognition of what he has termed "limited, political
membership" in the "Jewish people." It is Mallison's contention that the
"Jewish people" referred to in the political promise clause of the
Balfour Declaration, included only those who, at that time were, or
thereafter might become, Zionists. In his view, a limited "Jewish people"
concept was recognized in international law and put into effect through
such international agreements as the Balfour Declaration and the
League of Nations Mandate over Palestine, which incorporated that
Declaration.61
It would appear that Professor Mallison's definition must be
further clarified. Recognition of a "Jewish people" nationality group,
entitled to be regarded, collectively and individually, as members of
a political society in international law, must be based upon a declara-
tion of their intention to abandon all preexisting allegiance to any
other political society. A rejection of this contention would render
their position analogous to that of a citizen of country A who has not
publicly declared his intent to transfer his allegiance to country B
but, in fact, admits his allegiance to the latter without the knowledge
or consent of the former. On the other hand, adoption of that con-
tention would mean that only those contemporary or future Zionists
who intended (by virtue of a public act) to join the "Jewish people"
nationality as an alternative to their previously existing political affilia-
tions could be recognized as members of the "Jewish people." An
exception would occur whenever the States involved permitted dual
citizenship under their municipal laws. In this regard it is interesting
to note that neither the Zionist Organization nor the State of Israel
has ever accepted any limitation on membership in the "Jewish
people." In Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann,62 the Jerusalem
60 This letter is quoted in Mallison, Legal Problems Concerning the juridical Status
and Political Activities of the Zionist Organization; Jewish Agency: A Study of Inter-
national and United States Law, 9 Vr. & MARY L. REy. 556, 561 (1968).
61 Id.
62 Crim. Case No. 40/61 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem, Israel, Dec. 11-12, 1961), afl'd, Crim.
App. No. 336/61 (Sup. Ct., Israel, May 29, 1962).
The connection between the Jewish people and the State of Israel constitutes an
integral part of the Law of Nations. . . . The Balfour Declaration and the
Palestine Mandate given by the League of Nations to Great Britain constituted
an international recognition of the Jewish people....
Id.
Israeli nationality law should be distinguished from the "Jewish people" nationality
claims, an endeavor which is beyond the scope of the present study. It is important to
note, however, that Israeli nationality law is designed to facilitate the acquisition of
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District Court, in a judgment affirmed by the Supreme Court of Israel,
stated on May 29, 1962 that
[t]he connection between the Jewish People and the State of Israel
constitutes an integral part of the law of nations.... The Balfour
Declaration and the Palestine Mandate given by the League of Na-
tions to Great Britain constituted an international recognition of
the Jewish People.63
In that case, Israel purported to be acting in behalf of every European
Jew that was subject to the terrors of Hitler's regime, without regard
to their place of residence or nationality. Similarly, almost immediately
thereafter, the State of Israel claimed and collected reparations from
the Government of West Germany for the losses sustained and the
suffering endured by all Jews during the Nazi terror.
It is clear that the open-ended "Jewish people" nationality con-
cept violates the generally accepted view of nationality status in inter-
national law. The dicta of both the League of Nations and the United
Nations, as well as unilateral pronouncements by various governments
are simply not a source of international law.64 Moreover, there has
been no broad international agreement on the significance or validity
of the "Jewish people" concept, even in the narrow sense proposed by
Professor Mallison. It follows, we submit, that the "Jewish people"
concept is not a valid concept of international law, and cannot be
recognized as such solely because of Israel's unilateral declaration of
adherence to it (particularly in view of the fact that it contravenes
and violates the rights of others, i.e., the Palestinian people). 5
The confusion arising out of the "Jewish people" question is
Israeli nationality by that part of the "Jewish people" living outside Israel. See Law of
July 5, 1950, Law of Return, [1950] 4 LAws OF THE STATE OF ISRA.L 114, as amended, 8
ISRAEL. LAws 144; [1950] FUNDAMENTAL LAws 156, as amended, 8 IsRAEL. LAws 332. Section
1 of the Law of Return provides that "[e]very Jew has the right to come to !his country
as an 'oleh' [Jew immigrating to Israel]." See also Law of April 1, 1952, Nationality Law,
[1952] 5 LAws OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 50, as amended 12 IsRAEL LAws 99; Fundamental
Laws 254, as amended, [1952] FUNDAMENTAL LAwS 410.
63 Crim. Case No. 40/61 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem, Israel, Dec. 11-12, 1961).
64 The sources of international law are embodied in article 58 of the statute of the
International Court of Justice which states:
1.) The court whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions,
whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the
contesting States; (b) internat*onal custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law; (c) the generaL principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
and (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law. 2.) This provision shall not prejudice the
power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
I.CJ. Stat. art. 58.
65 See notes 52 & 59 supra.
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understandable. Prior to the creation of the State of Israel, a political
concept which would replace nationality or citizenship and compel
some form of political allegiance, was tactically indispensable to the
Zionist scheme. Once the State was established and the legal power
to confer Israeli citizenship was gained, the "Jewish people" concept
had to be legitimized. The solution to what would otherwise have
proven a legally cumbersome question was found in the distinction
between Israeli citizenship conferred by the State's civilian authority
and "Jewish nationality," which was borrowed by Israeli law from the
Halakah. The reader must be cautioned in his interpretation of this
intricate legal concept in Hebrew law. Halakah, or the religious law
of the Hebrews, applies to the Le'om, or "peoplehood." From this
religious premise, it is easy to attach the political overtones which
Zionism had created with respect to the definition and significance of
the "Jewish people" political concept. Zionists played on the religious
feelings of Jews, utilizing the rabbis' desire to maintain their exclusive
jurisdiction over religious matters by conveniently preserving a mis-
leading category of Jewish nationality in addition to Israeli citizen-
ship. Israeli identity cards and birth certificates not only have those
two categories listed separately, but to further accentuate the point, a
third category for religion is added. Thus, an Israeli Jew is a citizen
of Israel, a Jewish national and a Jew by faith. Orthodox Jews, as well
as non-Zionist groups such as the American Council for Judaism, reject
this proposition. There are probably two main considerations for the
Zionist approach: (1) to preserve the fiction of the political dogma em-
bodied in the Zionist "Jewish people" concept, as it was developed
prior to the establishment of the State; and (2) to perpetuate this doc-
trine. The purposes of its perpetuation are: (a) to attract, recruit and
induce more Jewish immigration into the State by perpetuating a po-
litical link between the original Zionist idea and its political embodi-
ment, i.e., the State of Israel; and (b) to claim, in this concealed
manner, Israel's "protective jurisdiction" over all Jews of the World.
These considerations are laden with the implication, which many
Jews specifically reject, that no Jew can escape his Jewish nationality.
Consequently, adoption of this doctrine would give Israel a color of
jurisdiction over Jews who, according to this dogmatic proposition,
would only be "citizens by convenience" of another State. The danger
of such a doctrine is that it saps the very foundation of allegiance to
the State to which a citizen belongs. To that extent, it subverts the
citizen's allegiance by claiming some right to it and by conferring
upon him privileges which are usually attributable only to one's own
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citizens. Certainly, the collection of reparations for Nazi wrongs against
the "Jewish people," the Law of Return and the continued solicita-
tion of non-Israeli Jews for financial support and immigration clearly
indicate a claim by Israel on all Jews of the world. It is the authors'
opinion that there is no surer way to invite anti-semitism.
The prospects for change were rekindled by the Shalit case, 6 in
which the Israel Supreme Court, in a rare en banc decision, held by a
vote of 5 to 4 on January 26, 1970, that all Israeli citizens are Israeli
nationals, and that official registries should record the nationality of
a Jewish citizen as Jewish, even though he would not be a Jew under
Halakahic Law. While the decision removes religious considerations
from the determination of nationality, it reinforces the Zionist
concept of "Jewish people" by leaving the category in existence (al-
though devoid of religious significance). Politically, the decision
secularizes nationality, so that it now has only the meaning which
former Premier David Ben-Gurion once attributed to it, i.e., that any-
one who wishes to be considered a Jew is part of the "Jewish people."
This is not, however, an altruistic open credo, for what would other-
wise prevent the Palestinian Arabs from declaring themselves "Jews"
and claiming a right to return under the Law of Return. Ben-
Gurion's view was a political necessity which still exists. Israel con-
tinues to seek the "return" of Russian Jews. That country will not
recognize Israel's claim to its citizens even if they are of the Jewish
faith, and like the United States, rejects the Zionist doctrine of "Jewish
people." As indicated earlier, Russian Jews are descendants of the
Khazars and indeed, many are the offspring of mixed marriages in
which the mother was not Jewish. Under Halakahic Law, if the mother
is not Jewish, the offspring would not be Jewish either. This was the
problem which confronted Shalit. His wife was a Gentile and his
children were not considered of Jewish nationality. Thus, prior to
Shalit, most Russian Jews could not qualify as members of the "Jewish
people" in a religious sense, and the Law of Return, under which they
hypothetically would have emigrated to Israel, hinged on membership
in the "Jewish people."
Notwithstanding the furor of the rabbinical centers of Israel, the
Shalit decision furthered the Zionist doctrine, and was capitalized upon
by the Israeli Cabinet, which proposed two laws to the Knesset. One
stipulates that converts to Judaism, as well as the children of a Jewish
mother are Jewish nationals. As for citizenship (and return) all
66 Sup. Ct. of Israel, Jan. 26, 1970.
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members of an immigrant family in which one spouse is Jewish would
be regarded as Jewish nationals.67
THE EMERGENCE OF THE ZIONISTS AS AN "INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC BODY"
In any consideration of the juridical status of Zionism and the
State of Israel, it is essential to distinguish sharply between Israelis
(nationals of the State), Zionists (adherents to a political doctrine) and
Jews (members of a religious community).68 It is true that most Jews
in the Western countries, particularly the United States (and some
non-Jews as well), provide emotional and financial support to Zionism
and Israel, and exercise political influence on behalf of either one or
both. However, it is also true that many Jews actively dissociate them-
selves from Zionism. 69 One may certainly be a Jew without being a
Zionist, and one may be a Zionist though not a Jew; an Israeli is a
citizen of that State and theoretically can be neither a Jew nor a
Zionist. These facts in themselves dispute the "Jewish people" concept,
as it is defined and used by the World Zionist Organization, i.e., as
the foundation of the State of Israel.
The Zionists contend that acceptance of the Zionist (not Jewish)
claim to Palestine has been legalized through the exercise of diplomacy
and world power politics, and that the participation of Zionists in
international agreements has rendered it imperative that the Zionist
Organization be established as an international public body recognized
as a limited subject of international law. Obviously, the validity of
these contentions must be explored in detail.
Legal personality is a legal fiction through which a legal system
attributes rights and obligations to an entity. This proposition is
applicable to both the domestic and the international legal orders.
The existing subjects of international law are free to extend the appli-
cation of international law to any entity which they see fit to admit
into the realm of the international legal system.70 Indeed, public
67 For a commentary on the Shalit case and the proposed legislation described, see
TME, Feb. 9, 1970, at 44; TiME, Feb. 2, 1970, at 50; The Los Angeles Herald Examiner,
Jan. 23, 1970; The Detroit News, Dec. 7, 1969, at 17B. For an interesting political com-
mentary, see The Chicago Daily News, Jan. 26, 1970, at 2.
68 U. Avnery, a member of the Israeli Knesset, has proposed an Israel without Zionism.
U. AVNERY, ISRAEL WrrHouT ZIONISTS (1960).
69 The American Council for Judaism, already referred to in connection with Zionist
nationality claims, is an anti-Zionist organization dedicated to maintaining and preserving
a sharp distinction between Judaism as a religious faith and the political concept of a
"Jewish people." It is the largest and best known such group and has actively opposed
the Zionist-Israeli position on Jewish nationality.
70 G. WEIssBEERG, INTERNATIONAL STArus OF THE U.N. 21-22 (1961).
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bodies are usually constituted as subjects of international law by means
of multilateral agreements among States. However, no one State pos-
sesses the authority to establish any public body as a subject of inter-
national law by unilateral act or fiat. Nevertheless, such bodies may
be said to achieve status under international law. This generally
requires an appraisal of their substantive powers and the application
of empirical tests. Professor Lauterpacht proposed these criteria:
In each particular case the question whether a person or a body is
a subject of international law must be answered in a pragmatic
manner by reference to experience and to the reason of the law as
distinguished from a preconceived notion as to who can be sub-
jects of international law.71
The average international organization may be said to have an inter-
national personality in view of its functions:
An organization [such as the Zionist Organization] could not carry
out the intentions of its founders if it was devoid of [an] inter-
national personality. It must be assumed that its members, by en-
trusting their functions to it... have clothed it with the compe-
tence to enable those functions to be effectively performed. 72
The Zionist Organization sought to gain recognition as an inter-
national public body (1) by explicit recognition from various States,
and (2) through multilateral agreements among States in which its
existence was explicitly mentioned. The most intensive of these efforts
involved the negotiations preceding the Balfour Declaration. That
Declaration is said to constitute recognition by the British Govern-
ment of the Zionist Organization as a public body. It manifested the
British view that the Organization had status to receive the political
promise clause and to be subjected to the limitations imposed in the
safeguard clause (both of which will be discussed below). This did not
amount to recognition as an international public body by the com-
munity of nations, but it was the first step in that direction.
When, as a consequence of its political alliance with the British
Government, the Zionist Organization was permitted to participate in
the drafting of the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, the
Zionists were able to gain more, but not all, of their political objec-
tives. Article 4 of the Mandate Agreement provided that "an appro-
priate Jewish agency shall be recognized" as a representative of the
Jewish inhabitants bf that country.73 Without considering here the
question of the Mandate itself, we must conclude that by this act, the
71 H. LAUTrERAcHT, INTERNATONAL LAw AND HUMAN RIGHTS 12 (1950).
72 U.N. Reparations Case, [1949] I.CJ. Rep. 4.
73 For the complete text of the Mandate Agreement, see 44 Stat. 2184 (1924).
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international community of nations recognized the Zionist Organiza-
tion as a public body, speaking on behalf of the Jews of Palestine. As
can be seen from the full text of article 4, certain legal limitations
were imposed upon the operations of the Jewish Agency, the new name
of the Zionist Organization (these limitations will be discussed in a
subsequent section). Finally, any reasonable doubt that might exist
concerning the public body status of the agency was resolved by the
decision in the first of the Mavromattis Concession Cases.74 There the
International Court of Justice held, with respect to article 4 of the
Mandate, that: "This clause shows that the Jewish Agency is in reality
a public body, closely connected with the Palestine Administration
and under its control in the development of the country.175
The principal juridical consequence of the attainment of public
body status is subjection to the law. There can be no grant of power
and status as a public body without accompanying legal obligations.
These include, at a minimum, both the specific legal limitations im-
posed in the Mandate Agreement and the general legal limitations
and commitments which apply to all subjects of international law.7 6
Thus, recognition as a public body not only presupposes ability to
undertake and carry out assumed obligations, but imposes the duty,
under sanction of law, to discharge in fact all such assumed obliga-
tions. One may indeed question the recognition granted the Zionist
Organization as a public body on these grounds.
THE ARAB EXPERIENCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE WESTERN POWERS
The Arab world labors under two basic notions, the first is that
Israel's creation was the product of perfidious plotting and treacherous
tactics, including both power politics and military force. The second
is that Zionists are abetted by the Western powers, who see in Israel
an extension of European colonization of the Arab world. To under-
stand these beliefs, one must examine the progression of Zionism in
Palestine, Israel's relationship, if any, with Great Britain and the
Western world, and the conspiracy against the Arab world which
apparently exists between them. An analysis of various international
agreements, and their significance in international law, will illustrate
how Great Britain, the Western world, and Israel have in fact, ma-
nipulated and distorted international law to the point where the Arab
74 Mavromattis Concession Cases, [1925] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2, No. 5; [1927] P.C.I.J.,
ser. A, No. 11.
75 Id.
76 Id. This is also discussed in Mallison, supra note 60, at 566.
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world, in particular, and most of the Third World in general, share the
belief that international law is the product and tool of Western
imperialism.
The declaration establishing the State of Israel cited the Balfour
Declaration of 1917 as one of the legal guarantees for its creation.
However, opponents of this view contend that the Balfour Declaration
had no legal effect because Great Britain did not possess jurisdiction,
sovereignty, or physical possession of Palestine either at the time of the
declaration or when the State of Israel was proclaimed in 1948. Fur-
thermore, they argue that no right exists under the terms of the Man-
date Agreement of 1922 to transfer a trust confided by the League of
Nations to Britain alone. They also assert that prior and subsequent
to the date of the Balfour Declaration, Great Britain had already given
conflicting pledges to Arab leaders. 7 Thus, the Arabs understandably
denounce the Balfour Declaration, and point instead to their reliance
upon their treaty relations with Great Britain.
An understanding of some basic concepts of international law is
necessary in order to analyze these conflicting contentions. Although
some international instruments are called treaties eo nomine, there
exists a wide vocabulary from which names for such instruments may
be chosen, e.g., pact, convention, protocol, agreement, arrangement,
declaration, act, statute, covenant. All these terms have been used to
designate international contractual instruments in recent times, and
in most cases, if not all, the choice of one term over another has little
or no substantive significance. s Thus, only the substance of the instru-
ment is relevant -not its label.
International agreements, to be binding, must be made between
subjects of international law. The case for the status of the Zionist
Organization in international law has been discussed previously,7 9 and,
as was illustrated, is one of marginal validity. That Great Britain and
the Arab States were subjects of international law is beyond all
question.
An international instrument need not be bilateral or multilateral,
and need not follow a specific legal form to be a binding document.80
In regard to the interpretation of an international instrument, its
negotiating history is of prime importance insofar as that history
reveals or indicates the intent of the contracting parties.81 In Great
77 F. Knounx, Tim A -AB-IsRAEL DILE. A 7-10, 14 (1968).
78 Mallison, supra note 47, at 1009.
79 See notes 36-67 and accompanying text supra.
80 HARVARD ESFARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, TREATES 937-39 (1932).
81 M. McDouGAL, H. LASSWELL& J. MILE R, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREMENTS AND
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Britain, the legislative history of the issues involved is included in
the interpretation of treaties to aid in ascertaining the intentions and
objectives of the British government. It is clear, then, that various
proposals, which are offered unilaterally by the parties to an inter-
national instrument, and abandoned or compromised in the course
of the negotiations, are particularly important and significant to the
interpretation of the parties' intent. 82 Furthermore, an understanding
of the negotiating history affords indispensable insight into its inter-
pretation. Therefore, the key to interpretation of any of the terms
involved is the political and historical context in which the agreements
were made.83 In this respect, the aim of the Zionists was perhaps para-
mount, and was best expressed in the following terms:
The advantages Zionism appeared to bring to any diplomatic ar-
rangement arose from Herzl's claim, through his position as pres-
ident of the World Zionist Organization, to represent [with the
potential to activate and direct] "the Jewish people" dispersed
throughout the world. It was ironic that Herzl [and Weiznann too
- some years later] should have projected this claim in negotia-
tions with various governments, since the reality was that Herzl,
to a great extent, sought major-power support to enhance Zionist
influence among those [Jews included] who opposed Zionism's ob-
jectives. Herzl, for example, aimed to have the British government
induce its own citizens of Jewish faith to "collaborate" with him.8 4
Herzl had begun negotiations with the British government as
early as 1902, and his successors continued talks with the British at
intervals thereafter.8 5 During the period of 1916 through 1918 when
the agreements considered here were negotiated, Great Britain main-
tains two primary objectives: to enlist the support of the Arab world
against the Ottoman Empire, and to enlist Jewish support against both
Woato Punuc ORoza (1967). The process of interpretation, rightly conceived, cannot be
regarded as a mere mechanical drawing of inevitable meanings from the words in a text,
or of searching for and discovering some preexisting specific intention of the parties with
respect to every situation arising under a treaty. It is precisely because the words used
in an instrument rarely have exact and single meanings, and because all possible situations
which may arise under it cannot be, or at least are not, foreseen and expressly provided
for by the parties at the time of its drafting, that the necessity for interpretation occurs.
In most instances, therefore, interpretation involves "giving" a meaning to a text-not
just any meaning which appeals to the interpreter, to be sure; but a meaning which, in
light of the text under consideration and of all the concomitant circumstances of the par-
ticular case at hand, appears in his considered judgment to be one which is logical, reason-
able and most likely to accord with and to effectuate the larger general purpose which the
parties desired the treaty to serve.
82 Id.
83 See notes 80-81 supra.
84 COMPLErE DIARIEs or T-EODoR HEREL 1304 (R. Patal ed. 1960) (emphasis added).
85 American Council for Judaism, The Making of Zionist Diplomacy, 32 Issurs 43
(1947).
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the Ottoman Turks and the Central Powers (Germany and Austro-
Hungary).""
While the British were striving to gain the support of both the
Arab world and the Jews, the immediate goal of the Zionists in Great
Britain and the United States was to obtain a guarantee from the Allies
that, in the event of a Turkish defeat, Palestine would be recognized as a
Jewish Commonwealth open to unrestricted immigration. To this end,
Chaim Weizmann, a prominent Jewish chemist in Great Britain (then
leader of the World Zionist Organization and first President of Israel),
building upon a reservoir of good will developed since Herzl's time,
gained the sympathy and active collaboration of a number of impor-
tant public figures in Great Britain.s7 Contrasted with the announced
goal of the Zionists was the early manifestations of Arab nationalism;
seeking to establish independent Arab States, various Arab leaders were
responding to Britain's request for aid to drive the Turks out of the
Arab lands. To secure the assistance of both the Arabs and Zionists,
while serving their own best interests, Britain obligated itself to both
sides through various commitments.
A. The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence
The Arab insistence that a British agreement with Arab leaders
on the disposition of Palestine antedated the Balfour Declaration relies
primarily on an exchange of letters in December of 1915 between
Sheriff Hussein of Hejaz and Sir Henry McMahon, British High Com-
missioner at Cairo.88 As previously noted, Britain stood in urgent need
of help in her plan to expel the Turks from Palestine, Syria, Lebanon,
Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula.8 9 In this correspondence, Hussein
promised to declare war against Turkey and to raise an Arab army
to assist the British in their military campaign. For their part, Com-
missioner McMahon, under instructions from London, pledged that
Britain would "support the independence of the Arabs" in the large
area bounded on the north by the 37th parallel (approximately the
northern boundary of Syria), on the east by the Iranian border down
to the Persian Gulf (enclosing Iraq), and in the south by the Arab
Gulf States. When Hussein demanded that the Western boundary be
established at the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, McMahon accepted
the Red Sea border but excluded from his pledge the coastal belt of
86 G. LENczowsKI, Ti MDIE EAST IN WOam AFAIRs 70 (1962).
87 Id. at 78.
88 Id. at 76; see also British Command Papers, Cbm No. 5957 (1939). See also G. AN-
TrONius, THE ARAB AwVArNINd chs. 7-9 (1946).
89 W. YALE, TuE NEAR EAsr 243-44, 256-58 (1954).
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Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Horns, Hama, and
Aleppo. This meant that the Arabs would be denied Lebanon and the
Alawi country to the north. Although Palestine was not explicitly
mentioned in these letters, the Arabs have always contended that the
region promised to them included Palestine. 0 On the other hand,
Winston Churchill declared when Arab delegates presented their claim:
This reservation [in the letters] has always been regarded by His
Majesty's Government as covering the wilayet of Beirut and the
independent Sanjuk of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of
the Jordan was thus excluded. 91
B. The Sykes-Picot Accord
McMahon's pledge to Hussein preceded by several months the
Anglo-French accord, the Sykes-Picot agreement, on the Middle East. 92
This pact, concluded on May 16, 1916, provided that upon cessation
of hostilities, France was to get the area known as Cilicia (Syria and
Lebanon), Britain, southern Mesopotamia (Iraq) with Bagdad, and
the ports of Haifa and Acre in Palestine while Palestine was, in gen-
eral, to be internationalized. Since secrecy was considered essential, the
terms of this agreement were never communicated to Hussein.
Clearly, the Sykes-Picot agreement was incompatible with Great
Britain's earlier pledge to Hussein which, disregarding the dispute over
Palestine, specifically assigned Mesopotamia to the Arabs. These two
agreements were followed 18 months later by the Balfour Declaration.
C. The Balfour Declaration
In form, the Balfour Declaration is a unilateral statement of
British policy, but the years of negotiation that preceded its issuance,
particularly the last three months of intensive discussion, reveal it as
a tripartite agreement93 among the British, the Zionists, and represent-
ing a substantial majority of British Jewry, the British Anti-Zionists. 94
90 G. LENCZOWSKI, supra note 86.
91 Id. See also RoYAL comm. at 20, 8.
92 G. LENCZOWSKI, supra note 86, at 72. The provisions of the Sykes-Picot accord were
incorporated into a corollary agreement with Russia which purported to recognize Russia's
postwar claim to Constantinople. These documents were discovered in tsarist files after
the October Revolution of 1917 and were published as evidence of western imperialist
chancery. In this manner, the world first learned the details of the Sykes-Picot scheme.
42 Stat. 1012 (1922).
93 Zionist leaders maintain that, although unilateral in form, the Declaration was
clearly a bilateral international instrument and that all its terms were binding upon both
Great Britain and the Zionists. That the Declaration was at least bilateral is obvious; that it
constituted an international instrument is at best highly debatable, both because the Zionist
Organization had not yet attained the apparent status of an international public body and
because of the intent of the parties at the time of the making of the Declaration.
94 Their purpose was to guard the interests of Jews already assimilated into the na-
tionalities of other countries. L. EPSTEIN, BarrsH PoLICIEs IN THm SUEz CIs 180-87 (1964).
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David Lloyd George, then Prime Minister of Great Britain, and
Foreign Secretary Sir A. J. Balfour, believed that the strong Jewish
influence in the Russian revolutionary movement made a favorable
response to Zionist aspirations essential. It was also deemed important
to woo Jewish support in the United States where, before America's
entrance into the war, the sympathies of the principal Jewish leaders,
all of German or Austrian background, lay with the Central Powers.
Zionists also argued, and many Britons believed, that an Allied pro-
nouncement in favor of Zionism might influence Austro-German Jewry
and help to induce disaffection and disloyalty within the enemy States.
Therefore, Sir Mark Sykes (of the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916) was
instructed to initiate formal negotiations, on behalf of the Allies, with
Nahum Sokolow, the representative of the Zionist Organization. Dur-
ing these talks the Zionists insisted upon a British protectorate over
Palestine, and although this would have constituted yet another con-
tradictory pledge, the British government was not adverse to it.
In any attempted analysis of the Balfour Declaration, two factors
must be carefully weighted: and contrasted:
1. The Political Promise Clause:
His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use
their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object.95
2. The Safeguard Clause:
[I]t being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish commu-
nities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by
Jews in any other country.90
The political promise clause can be considered to have been a
political defeat for the Zionist objectives. It is clear that the British
considered impracticable, at best, any thought of making Palestine
as a whole available as a Jewish national home or State, and at no time
during their negotiations did they entertain any such purpose.97 What
the British did, in fact, was to promise to "facilitate" -nothing more
- the establishment of a "national home" for the "Jewish people." In
1937, however, they modified their interpretation of this clause some-
what, and although still unwilling to commit themselves to the estab-
lishment of a Jewish national State, they indicated that the question
95 See L. STm, supra note 58, app. II.
90 Id.
97 CORESPONDENCE WnIH THE PALESTINE ARAn DELEGATION AND THE ZIONIST ORGANIZA-
TION, FIrM REPORT, CmI) No. 1700, at 19 (1922).
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of eventual statehood would depend mainly upon the goal and enter-
prise of the Jews.98 Since the British contemplated the home as
encompassing those Jews already in Palestine, they never feared an
onslaught of immigration or any change in the demographic balance
of Palestine (an Arab majority was to be maintained).
The Zionists, however, never bound themselves to such a rigid
construction of the political promise clause, but viewed it as the initial
step in the implementation of their plans. They proposed to assure
that Jews would, in the first instance, settle in Palestine, in sufficient
numbers to guarantee their safety, and then, through an ever-increas-
ing tide of immigration, establish their numerical and political pre-
dominance. If, when that point was reached, Palestine should be ac-
corded self-government, the country could then become a Jewish com-
monwealth with full equality of rights, extended to the new Arab
minority.99 From this point, it would be but one short step to trans-
form Palestine into a refuge for World Jewry in the hope that Pales-
tinians would be driven to resettle in neighboring Arab States.
It is difficult to determine from these conflicting interpretations,
whether British and Zionist leaders contemplated that a portion of
Palestine was to become a Jewish commonwealth, with a small Arab
minority, or whether all of Palestine was to become a Jewish common-
wealth with a large Arab minority. In view of the avowed Zionist
objectives (rather than their long-range expectations) and Britain's
contradictory promises to Arab leaders, the clause when drafted, must
be construed to have had a very restricted political meaning. In this
context, it becomes important to note that the State of Transjordon
was partially carved out of Palestine in 1920, three years after the
Balfour Declaration and two years before the creation of the Palestine
Mandate, and Great Britain specifically exempted that Arab region
from the terms of the Declaration. 100
In contrast, the safeguard clause seems clear and unequivocal. The
words "it being clearly understood" prove that however vague or am-
biguous the political promise clause might be, it was subordinated to
and conditioned upon the implementation of the safeguard clause
which reassured the non-Jewish population of Palestine that there
98 RoYAL Comm. at 24, 20.
99 L. STEIN, supra note 58, at 558.
100 The prime British purposes in the creation of Transjordan would appear to have
been political and military: to establish and preserve unhampered control of the territory
bordering Syria and to permit easy defense against any French designs on the Mosul-
Kirkuk oil field, which had been promised to France under the Sykes-Picot agreement,
then occupied and held by British troops in defiance of this accord.
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would be no resulting injury to their rights from the political bargain
struck between Britain and the Zionists. The specific words employed
referred to actual rights enjoyed by Arabs under Ottoman rule, which
were deemed to include, inter alia, such basic rights as freedom of
religion, the right to own land, and mobility within the territory.
Since the Arab population of Palestine included both Muslims and
Christians, it was indispensable that their religious rights not be
prejudiced.10 1 Therefore, it was implicit in the guarantees embodied
within the safeguard clause that the rights of Christians and Muslims
to the maintenance and protection of their shrines and religious exer-
cises would be assured. As to their civil rights, the ultimate indepen-
dence of Palestine was intended to be achieved through the implemen-
tation of gradual self-determination.
Since the clauses of any document must be interpreted in a chrono-
logical order to achieve an internal consistency, it is clear from the
history of negotiations behind the Declaration that the British govern-
ment agreed to support - if not, indeed, specifically to protect and
secure - the recognition and observance of the rights of the non-Jew-
ish population.
One vital item evidencing this intent was the creation of Trans-
jordan, already referred to.102 A second was the White Paper on Pales-
tine issued by the British government in June of 1922, which said
in part:
Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the
purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine . . . that
Palestine is to become "as Jewish as England is English." His Maj-
esty's Government ... have no such aim in view.... [T]he terms
of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine
as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but
that such a Home should be founded in Palestine.0 3
During the period between the two world wars, the Arabs and
their partisans argued that the political and safeguard clauses of the
Declaration, far from being supplementary, were in fact and in law,
101B. Weinberg, The Zionist Commission for Palestine, 1960, at 40 (unpublished
thesis, Dep't of History, Roosevelt Univ.).
102 See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
103 Cm No. 1700, supra note 97, at 18. In May 1939, the British government again
reiterated this same view:
His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part
of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State -they would indeed
regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well
as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that
the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State
against their will.
PALET E- STATI MNT OF PoLicy, Fmsr REP ORT, CMD No. 6019, at 4 (1939).
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contradictory. After World War II, the British government itself
veered toward this view. On February 25, 1947, Foreign Secretary
Ernest Bevin told the House of Commons:
There is no denying the fact that the Mandate [which incorporated
the Balfour Declaration] contained contradictory promises. In the
first place it promised the Jews a National Home and in the sec-
ond place, it declared the rights and position of the Arabs must be
protected. Therefore, it provided what was virtually an invasion
of the country by thousands of immigrants and at the same time
said that was not to disturb the people in possession.104
D. The Hogarth Message
When Sheriff Hussein learned of the contents of the Balfour
Declaration, he demanded an explanation from the British government
and protested that the Declaration violated the pledge made to him
two years earlier. Britain responded by sending Commander D. C.
Hogarth with a message which he delivered to Hussein on January 4,
1918, assuring the Arab emir that Britain's decision to assist the return
of the Jews to Palestine meant only "so far as is compatible with the
existing population" and did not contemplate establishment of a Jewish
State.105 Hussein accepted this explanation, and his son, Emir Faisal,
later discussed with Chaim Weizmann the terms and conditions under
which immigrant Jews might enter Palestine. 06
With Britain committed to recognition of their organization and
to at least a partial acceptance of their program, the Zionists turned
to the other Allied Powers in an effort to win approval for the Balfour
Declaration. France approved it on February 11, 1918, and Italy ap-
proved it 12 days later. President Woodrow Wilson signified his en-
dorsement in a letter to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise on October 29, 1918.107
In this manner, the Zionists were able to attain the status of un-
official allies of the Western powers. For example, the London For-
eign Office went so far as to extend them the privilege of the British
diplomatic pouch. 08 In return, the Zionists were expected to render
valuable assistance in the prosecution of the war. What contribution
they may have made to that objective is uncertain, but David Lloyd
George told the Palestine Royal Commission in 1936:
104 I. TANNOUS, THE ENRAGING STORY OF PALESTINE AND ITS PEOPLE 11 (1965) (pamphlet
published by Palestine Liberation Organization).
105 F. KHOURI, supra note 77, at 8-9.
106 The Faisal-Weizmann Agreement is discussed at notes 110-14 and accompanying text
infra.
107 F. KHouR, ,supra note 77, at 8-9.
1081d.
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Zionist leaders gave us definite promises that if the Allies com-
mitted themselves to giving facilities for the establishment of a
national home in Palestine they would do their best to rally Jewish
sentiment and support throughout the world for the Allied cause.
They kept their word. 0 9
E. The Faisal-Weizmann Accord
As indicated earlier, the Arabs considered the Allied proposal to
separate Palestine from Syria a breach of the McMahon pledge. 110
Historically, they had always considered Palestine more closely linked
to Syria than to any other part of the Arab nation. Hussein, however,
appeared to have attained most of his objectives by October of 1918.
His emirate of Hejaz was recognized as a sovereign State and he was
accorded recognition as its king. In addition, his son, Emir Faisal, was
to take part in the Paris peace conference as a representative of that
kingdom. At this conference Faisal was persuaded not only to accept
but also to welcome the policy set out in the Balfour Declaration, and his
statement to the members of the conference was conciliatory in tone:
In Palestine the enormous majority of the people are Arabs. The
Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood .... Nevertheless, the
Arabs cannot risk assuming the responsibility of holding level the
scales in the clash. ... that [has] in this province so often involved
the world in difficulties. They would wish for the effective super-
vision of a great trustee, so long as a representative local adminis-
trative organization commended itself by actively promoting the
material prosperity of the country."'l
Even more conciliatory was the agreement reached between Faisal
and Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionists, on January 3,
1919. The text of this agreement was in English, except for an im-
portant reservation inserted by Faisal at the end of the document.
The agreement recited that the
surest means for the consummation of their [Arabs' and Zionists']
national aspiration is through .. . closest cooperation of the Arab
State and Palestine . . . Arab and Jewish duly accredited agents
shall be established and maintained in their respective territories.
... The definite boundaries between the Arab State and Palestine
shall be determined by a commission to be agreed upon .... The
constitution and administration of Palestine shall afford the fullest
guarantee for carrying into effect the [Balfour Declaration]. . ..
All necessary measures shall be taken to ... stimulate immigration
109 RoYAL CoM. at 31, 3 5.
110 See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
111 F. KHouRa, supra note 77, at 12.
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of Jews into Palestine on a large scale.... In taking such measures
the Arab peasants and farmers shall be guaranteed in their rights."1
However, since Faisal's authority to act derived from his father Hus-
sein, who considered Palestine to be part of the realm promised
him, Faisal added a final proviso, handwritten and in Arabic, to the
Declaration.
Provided the Arabs obtain their independence as in my Memoran-
dum dated the 4th of January, 1919 .... [If] the slightest modifica-
tion were made I shall not be bound.., by a single word of this
Agreement, which shall be deemed void and of no account or va-
lidity." 3
As no available source material includes the text of Faisal's memoran-
dum of January 4, it would appear that this document was, at the
time of signing the agreement, still to be written or that the date "4th
of January" was in error. In any event, unbiased historians agree that
the Faisal-Weizmann accord was never made effective."14
F. The Effects of These Agreements and the Background of the
Mandate
An international agreement is binding upon the parties, and any
subsequent agreement between either of the parties to the original agree-
ment and a third party cannot derogate from the terms of the original
accord without being considered a breach thereof. Similarly, rights
acquired by a party to an international agreement cannot be undone
by a subsequent conflicting promise to another party. However, if
such a conflicting promise is actually made, the third party will acquire
no rights superior to those of the parties to the original compact -
there can be no derogation of the existing or acquired rights of others.
The acceptance of this doctrine is mandated by the world community's
need for international order and stability; for without such a doctrine,
no agreements could be relied upon as a source of rights, duties, and
obligations.
The Arabs, therefore, claim that as first in time they are first in
right; and hence, any benefits accruing from their agreements with the
British are superior to the subsequent and contradictory promises made
to the Zionists.
Faced with the need of securing multilateral international con-
firmation of the Balfour Declaration and of ensuring its inclusion in
112 Id.
113 See text accompanying note 112 supra.
114 B. Weinberg, supra note 101, at 40.
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the peace treaties after the defeat of Turkey, the Zionists encountered
substantial opposition, even within Great Britain. For example, while
the Declaration was still being debated within the British government,
Edwin Montagu, the only Jew with direct access to such matters, was
an implacable foe of political Zionism. 115 In addition, the Board of
Deputies of British Jews, the largest Jewish organization in Britain,
campaigned against the Zionist program.1"8 Even in the United States,
the Zionist movement encountered substantial opposition. In fact, the
Zionists were unable to attract effective political support because the
prevailing sentiment among Jewish Americans reflected the view
posited 36 years earlier at a conference of Jewish reform rabbis.117
We consider ourselves no longer a nation but a religious commu-
nity. And therefore expect neither a return to Palestine, nor a
sacrificial worship under the administration of the sons of Aaron,
nor the restoration of any of the laws concerning the Jewish state." 8
Nevertheless, because Great Britain had included the Zionist program,
or part of it, as official British policy, the United States Government
acceded in the end.
By the time the peace treaties marking the end of World War I
were drafted, world opinion had seemingly forced the framers of those
treaties to conform to President Wilson's 14 points, the new principles
of non-imperialism and national self-determination; even though
that program conflicted sharply with British, French, and Italian plans.
Pushed to its logical conclusion, the 14 points would have nullified
nearly all of the agreements involving the postwar disposition of the
conquered Turkish province. A device designed to compromise, and in
some measure circumvent, President Wilson's principles for the benefit
of the victorious allies' imperial interests was found in the mandate sys-
tem embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations.
G. The League of Nations Mandate
The mandate system was without precedent in the history of
international law. Theoretically, mandated territories were potentially
sovereign states, temporarily under the tutelage of one or another
major power until such time as, in the League's judgment, full inde-
pendence was merited. The Mandated Territory was to be under the
control of the Mandatory Power which, in turn, was responsible to
115 L. SEwN, supra note 58, at 484.
110 L. EPSTMN, supra note 94, at 182.
117 W. YALE, supra note 89, at 147.
118 Id.
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the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. Since
the League itself and all its agencies were in fact managed and domi-
nated by the major powers, the arrangement was a cozy one for ambi-
tious European empires. For example, while the degree of control
and authority to be exercised by the Mandatory Power was to be
explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations, n 9 mandated
territories were classified according to their degree of political ripe-
ness, again, as determined by the League. In Class A were those con-
sidered provisionally independent, i.e., most ready for complete
independence. Palestine was a Class A mandate, a "provisionally inde-
pendent" state. Essentially, the theory behind the mandate system
envisaged the independence of the mandated territory as the only
natural conclusion of the mandate; the Palestine mandate, like the
others, encompassed no other provisions for its termination.
On April 20, 1920, the Supreme Allied Council allocated the
Palestinian Mandate to Great Britain. In March of 1921, the British
detached all territory east of the Jordan River from Palestine - this
territory had historically been a part of Palestine since before the
arrival of the Hebrews led by Moses - and established the emirate
of Transjordan. On June 30, 1922, the United States Congress adopted
a resolution essentially identical to the Balfour Declaration, with the
added provisio that religious buildings and holy places in Palestine
were to be adequately protected. 2 0 On July 22, 1922, the League
formally confirmed Great Britain as the Mandatory Power for Palestine,
while France was granted the Mandate over Syria. The Syrian Mandate
which then included Lebanon, was part of a plan to placate France
for the violation of the Sykes-Picot accord, and was approved despite
the bitter opposition of both the Syrian leaders and their people.' 2 '
119 To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have
ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them
and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the
strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle
that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civ-
ilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied
in this Covenant.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 1.
Mallison, supra note 47, at 1030, states:
By the terms of the Covenant the "sacred trust of civilization" was to be exercised
for the benefit of the people inhabiting the respective territories. This applied,
prima facie, to the existing inhabitants of Palestine, whatever the religious identi-
fication of individual Palestinians. This provision of the Covenant, protecting ter-
ritories "inhabited by peoples," is clearly inconsistent with "the Jewish people"
nationality claims based upon the religious identification of individuals who are
the inhabitants of many territories.
12042 Stat. 1012 (1922).
121 President Woodrow Wilson, with Allied approval, sent an American commission
[VOL. 44:399
REAL AND APPARENT ISSUES
On the other hand, while the Palestinian Arabs were demanding im-
mediate independence, their leaders were willing to accede to an
American or British mandate. However, because the United States
was not a member of the League it could not become a Mandatory
Power. Thus, the Arabs had no choice but to accept Britain in that
role.a 2
On December 3, 1924, the United States and Great Britain entered
into a convention setting forth the respective rights of the two countries
and their nationals in Palestine. This pact recited the entire text of the
Mandate Agreement, including its preamble, thus confirming complete
American acceptance of all its provisions. 123 The preamble of the
Agreement reiterated the terms of the Balfour Declaration, which
were specifically incorporated into article 2 of the Agreement. By the
terms of article 4, the Zionist Organization was appointed to advise
and cooperate with the mandatory administration on matters relating
to the Jewish National Home; and the administration was to enact a
nationality law whose provisions would facilitate the acquisition of
Palestinian citizenship by Jews who might take up permanent residence
in Palestine. Finally, under the terms of article 28, the League was
to make such arrangements as might be deemed necessary for safe-
guarding, in perpetuity, free access to holy places, religious buildings,
and sites should the Palestine Mandate be terminated.1 24
Concerning the question of sovereignty during the period of the
Mandate, there has been no general agreement among scholars. Some
authorities contended that sovereignty, though temporarily in suspen-
sion, resided in the inhabitants of the mandated territory, while others
found sovereignty in the League of Nations, or even in the Mandatory
Power, either alone or acting in concert with the League. Still other
views were offered, but perhaps the most logical suggestion placed
sovereignty in the League, which had asserted its supreme authority
(the King-Crane Commission) to the Middle East to determine the wishes of the peoples
there. This group recommended establishment of a wholly independent Syria (including
Lebanon) and strongly opposed establishment of a Zionist-Jewish entity in Palestine. See
F. KnoumI, supra note 77, at 13.
122 The allegation that the wishes of the Palestine community had been ignored in
the selection of a Mandatory Power has to be considered in light of the July 2, 1919
resolutions of the General Syrian Congress. There, in considering the possibility of the
establishment of a mandate of Arab countries under certain conditions, the Congress
named the United States as its first choice to serve as a Mandatory Power and Great
Britain as its second.
123 44 Stat. 2184 (1924).
124 Mallison, supra note 47, at 1034. Cf. Feinberg, The Interpretation of the Anglo.
American Convention on Palestine 1924, 3 INT'L L. Q. 475 (1950).
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over Palestine and had delegated the exercise of that authority to the
Mandatory Power. 125 Whatever view we care to take as to the question
of sovereignty, the Arabs asserted that the Mandate violated article
22 of the League Covenant for two reasons: first, because the com-
munity of Palestine was not recognized as an independent nation,
and second, because the Mandatory Power was granted full legislative
and administrative control over the Mandate by the League's Council.
In opposition to this claim it has been argued:
(a) that the provisional recognition of "certain communities
formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire" as independent
States is permissive, i.e., the words are can be provisionally
recognized, not will or shall;
(b) that the penultimate paragraph of article 22 prescribed that
the degree of authority to be exercised by the Mandatory
Power shall be determined by the Council of the League as
the need arises;
(c) that acceptance by the Allied Powers of the policy incorpor-
ated within the Balfour Declaration made it clear from the
beginning that Palestine would be treated differently from
Syria and Iraq; and that this difference was confirmed by the
Supreme Council in the Treaty of S6vres and by the Council
of the League in granting the Mandate.
2 6
Again, however, one must also consider the fact that the decision to
establish a mandate system and to bring Arab communities within its
purview was the product of an assembly of States in which no Arab
country had any voice whatsoever. Therefore it was apparent that the
territories inhabited by the Arabs were being bartered and parceled out
like common objects for everyone's benefit but their own.
To this date, there has been much controversy over the relative
weight to be accorded the provisions in the Mandate Agreement re-
garding the National Home and those that concerned self-government;
in other words, whether they were consistent with each other. Some
have suggested that between these obligations the Mandate recognizes
no primacy, no order of importance, and that they were in no way
irreconcilable. Others, however, contend that the primary purpose
of the Mandate, as expressed in its preamble and its provisions, was
125 See generally L. STEIN, supra note 58. Reference is not made to the United Nations
trusteeship provisions because the conditions and intent of the mandate system differs
from the trusteeship system and because the context of the Palestine question has no
parallel under the trusteeship system.
126 See, e.g., L. STEIN, supra note 58.
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to promote the establishment of a Jewish National Home, therefore
subordinating the obligations to develop self-governing institutions.
However, both positions are merely conjectural because they represent
a narrow view of the overall question. This controversy was, however,
of practical significance. If, for example, the country was to be adminis-
tered so as to promote self-governing institutions, those conditions
would in fact destroy the concept of a Jewish National Home; indeed,
the Arab majority would never permit its establishment. Hence, it
would appear that although difficulties were expected, the Mandate
failed to recognize that these dual obligations would, in fact, prove
incompatible.
The Mandate for Palestine is significant in international law be-
cause it contained an explicit agreement by the League to the pro-
visions of the Balfour Declaration clearly amounting to international
approval of the Declaration's compromise agreement. It thus becomes
plausible to argue that the claims of the Zionist Organization, as
embodied in the practices of Israel, are now a part of customary
international law to the extent that they comply with its requirements.
Customary international law is traditionally regarded as the sum
of two constituent elements; the first being the existence of a particular
uniform pattern of conduct in the past which, without more, may be
dismissed as mere recurring conduct which does not attain the status
of custom. The second element requires an opino juris or an element
of moral "rightness" ascribed to the past uniformities in conduct. To
prescribe international law by custom does not require that the past
uniformities in conduct must have existed over a long period of time.
Time is only significant as evidence of continuity and the contemporary
expectations of decision-makers as to the existence of the custom, so that
it can acquire the characteristics of customary international law. 27
It is, of course, clear that the growth of a practice into a rule of
international law depends upon the degree of its acceptance by the
international community. If a State initiates a practice hitherto without
precedent in international law, the fact that other States do not object
is significant evidence that they do not consider it contrary to inter-
national law. If this practice becomes more general, as evidenced by
common usage without objections from other States, the practice may
give rise to a rule of customary international law.128 This explains
127 See 3 M. WHITENrAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 75-90 (1964) and citations
therein.
128 Mallison, supra note 47, at 1061-63.
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Israel's consistency in continuing Zionist policy and the Arab States'
persistence in denying its validity.
THE UNITED NATIONS PARTITION OF PALESTINE AND
THE CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
As Jewish immigration to Palestine increased, Arab opposition
grew more and more intense. The Arabs demanded self-determination,
and from the early 1920's insisted upon the establishment of a demo-
cratic, parliamentary form of government. In pursuit of this policy,
they rejected an early British suggestion for an Arab Agency which
would be equivalent to the Jewish Agency. Ultimately, however,
various Arab groups did form a coalition called the Arab Higher
Committee.
Added impetus to Jewish immigration was generated by the rise
of Hitler's despotic regime in Germany; the consequent Jewish exodus
alone accounted for more than 60,000 new arrivals in 1935.129 This,
however, resulted in renewed Arab unrest. In 1937 the Arabs rebelled,
and their struggle continued until finally suppressed by British troops
in 1939. Although the revolt was unsuccessful it had two far-reaching
effects. First, the Jews in Palestine formed several guerilla units, the
predecessors of the Israeli army; and second, it brought about the
inevitable British reaction to every manifestation of Arab unrest-
after each new crisis a commission visited Palestine to investigate, and
each time it went back to London with a voluminous report. This
time, however, the report of the Palestine Royal Commission of 1936-
1938 took on added significance. With all hope for an Arab-Jewish
reconciliation abandoned, the Commission proposed partition: the
division of Palestine into an Arab State, a Jewish State, and a neutral
enclave around Jerusalem and Bethlehem under continued British
administration. While the Arab Higher Committee virtually rejected
the scheme, the Jewish Agency was willing to accept it, with some reser-
vations.
With war coming in Europe, and the continued unrest in the
Arab countries, intensified ,by universal Arab resentment to British
support of Zionism in Palestine, a dangerous threat was posed to
the security and stability of the entire British-Arab empire. As a result,
on May 17, 1939, Great Britain issued a White Paper 130 establishing
new principles for the administration of the Palestine Mandate and
reversing its earlier policy. Britain now proposed the creation, within
129 ROYAL CoMm. at 1958.
180 British White Paper, CMD No. 6019 (1939).
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10 years, of an independent Palestinian State linked with Great Britain
by special treaty. On the two most important issues, land and immigra-
tion, the new policy marked a virtual acceptance of the Arab position.
Jewish immigration was to be limited to a total of 75,000 persons
during the ensuing five years, and thereafter no immigrant was to be
admitted without specific Arab approval. In addition, the British High
Commissioner in Palestine was authorized to regulate, limit, or pro-
hibit the further transfer of Arab-owned land to Jewish ownership,
and Palestine was to be partitioned into Arab, Jewish, and neutral
zones under the same administration.
The 1939 White Paper shocked the Zionists and precipitated a
violent reaction, the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League
of Nations declared the Paper wholly incompatible with the terms of
the Mandate,131 but Britain held steadfast to her newly announced
policy; the hope of preserving her Arab empire for strategic reasons
was more important than Zionists protests. 132
The first years of World War II witnessed a lull in the Palestinian
dispute. Finally, in May 1942, the American Zionist Organization issued
a manifesto called the Biltmore Program 33 which declared that the
Balfour Declaration was no longer valid and called for the establish-
ment of an independent Jewish State. To this end, the manifesto
further urged the creation of a strong Jewish army for the defense of,
and the construction of a governmental structure for the administra-
tion of, the new State. In Jerusalem the Jewish Agency defied the manda-
tory authorities and adopted the Biltmore Program as official Zionist
policy. As the war ended, tens of thousands of illegal immigrants
entered Palestine, and Arab-Zionist tensions reached a new peak.
In February 1947, the British government announced that it was
not prepared to continue indefinitely to govern Palestine itself merely
because Arabs and Jews could not agree upon the means of sharing its
government between them. Accordingly, on April 2, 1947, Britain
asked the General Assembly of the United Nations to make recom-
mendations, under article 10 of the Charter, concerning the future
government of Palestine, and suggested convocation of a special Assem-
bly session for the purpose of constituting and instructing a special
committee to prepare a preliminary study for consideration by the
Assembly at its next regular session. Thereafter, five Arab States
131 L. SOHN, THE UNITED NATIONS IN ACTION 4 (1968).
132 The Suez Canal ran through Arab territory, and while the Red Sea was an Arab
lake, it was through these waters that Britain ran her imperial lifeline to the Arab lands,
India, and the islands of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.
133 F. KHOURI, supra note 77, at 29-30.
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asked that the special session consider the termination of the Mandate
over Palestine and the declaration of its independence. The General
Assembly refused to include the Arab request in its agenda and instead,
named a special committee with the widest powers to ascertain and
record fact and investigate all questions and issues relevant to the
problem of Palestine. On the same day, the Assembly called upon
all nations to refrain from invoking the use of force. Although the
Arab Higher Committee refused to cooperate with the United Nations
Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), Arab representatives
testified before the committee.
As a consequence of these hearings, UNSCOP reported two sets
of recommendations: a majority plan calling for the partition of Pales-
tine into Jewish and Arab States with economic union and an inter-
national trusteeship for Jerusalem, and a minority plan for a federal
union with autonomous Arab and Jewish regions. 13 4 This majority
report, with some modifications, was adopted by the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on the Palestine Question which had been created by the
second session of the General Assembly to study the UNSCOP re-
port. Initially this plan met with substantial opposition, but in the
plenary session, some States changed their votes, and on November
29, 1947, a two-thirds majority of those voting approved the plan for
partition. 135
Great Britain had approached the General Assembly in the ex-
pectation that that body could offer recommendations under article
10 of the Charter, according to which the Assembly could discuss any
question within the scope of the Charter and make recommendations
to members of the United Nations or to the Security Council. Essen-
tially the question involved the form of government to be established
for a territory whose population was not yet self-governing. Such a
question was clearly within the competence of the United Nations
under the declaration regarding non-self-governing territories in Chap-
ter XI of the Charter and the provisions of Chapter III concerning
the international trusteeship system. Article 14 (recommendations
for the peaceful adjustment of any situation likely to impair the
general welfare or friendly relations among nations) could also be con-
134 L. SOHN, supra note 131, at 45-47.
135 This majority was achieved only through strong pressures applied by the United
States. The methods used were bitterly criticized by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal
(see THE FORRFSTAL DiAmREs 180, 363 (W. Millis ed. 1951) and Sumner Welles, Undersecre-
tary of State (see S. VLLEs, WE NEED NOT FAIL (1948)). Other U.S. officials and historians
have also asserted that the Partition Resolution, GA. Res. 181, U.N. Doc. A/519 at 131
(1947), was "steamrollered" through the General Assembly by the United States.
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sidered relevant to the Palestine situation.136 It is dear, however, that
any action by the General Assembly pursuant to articles 10 and 14
amounts to a mere recommendation and cannot be enforced by the
Assembly acting alone. The central question, then, becomes: What is
the binding effect of a General Assembly recommendation with respect
to non-self-governing territories?
It may be said that the United Nations has clear jurisdiction with
respect to countries formerly mandated under the League of Nations.
This jurisdiction is set out in detail with regard to procedures and
powers insofar as they concern conversion of a mandate to a trusteeship
agreement. The way is left open for utilizing other solutions to the
problems of an existing mandate. In a resolution adopted by the
United Nations on April 18, 1946, the judgment was expressed that
the functions previously performed by the League should be assumed
by the United Nations. The League took further note of the intentions
of the Mandatory Powers to continue to administer the mandated terri-
tories in accordance with the terms of the mandates until other arrange-
ments could be agreed upon. Subsequently, in an advisory opinion on
July 11, 1950, the International Court of Justice clarified the power
of the General Assembly with respect to former mandates. 137 The
Court held that there were decisive reasons for an affirmative answer
to the question of the obligation of the Mandatory Power to submit
to the supervision and control of the United Nations.138 The obliga-
tion of the Mandatory Power to accept international supervision and
submit reports of its stewardship is thus an integral part of the mandate
system. In fact, the authors of the system considered that effective
performance of this "sacred trust of civilization" required that adminis-
tration of mandated territories be subject to international control and
supervision; even to the extent that the necessity for supervision be
continued despite the disappearance of the supervisory organ itself.
Having determined that the General Assembly was the legally
qualified successor to the League of Nations, and, as such, could
exercise the supervisory functions previously carried out by the League
over the mandated territories, the Court further concluded that the
Mandatory acting alone has not the competence to modify the inter-
national status of the mandated territory, 39 that competence to deter-
136 Mr. EI-Khouri expressed the Syrian view in the Ad Hoc Committee that neither
article 10 nor article 14 applied. L. SOHN, supra note 134, at 45.
137 Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South West Africa, [1950] IC.J.
128.
13SId. at 130.
139 Id.
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mine and modify the international status of the mandated territory
rests with the Mandatory acting with the consent of the General
Assembly. The Court next declared that under articles 79 and 85 of
the Charter the General Assembly was granted the authority to approve
alterations or amendments to trusteeship agreements. By analogy it
can then be inferred that the same procedure is applicable to any
modification of the international status of a mandated territory which
would not result in the acquisition of trusteeship for the mandated
territory.
Article 79, referred to by the Court, provides that the terms of
trusteeship shall be approved as provided in articles 83 and 85. Under
article 83, the Security Council was granted jurisdiction over all
functions of trusteeships in "strategic areas," whereas article 85 gives
jurisdiction to the General Assembly in "non-strategic areas." Carried
to its logical conclusion, the opinion of the Court would lead to the
view that the Mandatory Power cannot unilaterally terminate the
mandate and that any solution must be approved by the Security Coun-
cil or the Assembly. The solution decided upon by the appropriate
body would then be binding upon all member States. However, no
method is prescribed to determine what may or may not be a "strategic
area." Of paramount significance in this context is article 80, which
prohibits the alteration in any manner of the existing rights of the
population of trust territories. After the passage of the plan for parti-
tion, the United Nations Palestine Commission set up by the resolution
was confronted by the refusal of the British to let the Commission enter
Palestine, despite clear evidence of the impending collapse of the man-
date administration.
As a result, on February 16, 1948, the Commission asked the Se-
curity Council to provide it with an adequate, non-Palestinian military
force. The Council denied this request and another, proffered by the
United States, which would have allowed the Council itself to -enforce
the terms of the partition resolution. Meanwhile, in Palestine dis-
orders increased and on April 1, 1948, the Security Council asked the
Secretary General to consider further the question of the future gov-
ernment of Palestine. On April 17, the Council called upon all parties
to cease military operations and asked the British government to use
its best endeavors to achieve a peaceful settlement. Subsequently, the
Assembly met in special session on April 19, 1948, and considered sev-
eral trusteeship proposals with respect to both Palestine as a whole and
the City of Jerusalem. On May 14, 1948, the Assembly adopted a reso-
lution abolishing the Palestine Commission and authorizing the ap-
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pointment of a United Nations mediator to bring about a peaceful
settlement in Palestine.1 40 On that same day, May 14, Britain withdrew
from Palestine; the mandate thus expired and the Jewish community
declared the birth of the State of Israel, a unilateral declaration which
resulted in the immediate recognition of Israel, as an independent sov-
ereign state, by the United States and several other members of the
world community.141 Simultaneously, the Arab States declared that the
collapse of peace and order in Palestine constituted a direct threat to
peace and security in the Arab States themselves. On these grounds, the
Arab States intervened on behalf of the Palestinian Arabs and opened a
period of conflict that still continues. Shortly after Israel's declaration
of independence, the General Assembly passed the famous and often
reconfirmed resolution 194 of December 11, 1948, which in para-
graph 11 recognized that under international law the Palestinian peo-
ple were entitled to return to their homeland and to receive economic
compensation. 42 Today, the Palestinians still claim their right to return
and to be restored to their civil and political rights as nationals of
Palestine or its successor State. It was not until December 10, 1969,
that the United Nations "[r]eafflrm[ed] the inalienable rights of the
people of Palestine." The words people of Palestine constitute the first
official recognition that it is no longer a "refugee" question, but one
of nationhood. This resolution recalls prior United Nations' resolu-
tions from 1948 to December 1968. Twenty years of resolutions noting,
affirming, directing, calling upon, and emphasizing Palestinians' rights
to no avail. The historical significance of this resolution warrants its
partial inclusion in this text:
Part B. The General Assembly,
Recognizing that the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees
has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,
Gravely concerned that the denial of their rights has been
aggravated by the reported acts of collective punishment, arbitrary
detention, curfews, destruction of homes and property, deportation
and other repressive acts against the refugees and other inhabitants
of the occupied territories,
140 G.A. Res. 186, U.N. Doe. A/555, at 5 (1948).
141 As former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson puts it:
[Israel was] recognized the same day by President Truman on a de facto basis
while his representative at the United Nations, Dr. Philip C. Jessup, was under
instructions, speaking in the General Assembly in favor of a temporary trusteeship.
D. Ac EsON, PREsFrr AT THE CREATION 258 (1969). Such duplidty is still vivid in Arab
memory.
142 GA. Res. 194, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 21 (1948).
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Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June
1967,
Recalling also its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, and
2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 calling upon "the Govern-
ment of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return
without delay of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since
the outbreak of hostilities,"
Desirous of giving effect to its resolutions for relieving the
plight of the displaced persons and the refugees,
1. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine;
2. Draws the attention of the Security Council to the grave
situation resulting from Israeli policies and practices in the occu-
pied territories and Israel's refusal to implement the above resolu-
tions;
3. Requests the Security Council to take effective measures
in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations to ensure the implementation of these resolutions.
1827th plenary meeting,
10 December 1969.143
THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION IN PALESTINE UNDER THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS
The Arab nations claim that the guarantees accorded the Zionists
and the actions of the United Nations subsequent to Israel's self-
declaration as a State violated the Palestinian Arabs' right of self-deter-
mination.1-4
Self-determination originated as a political doctrine that first
manifested itself in the French and American Revolutions. It refers,
in its political context, to the free and genuine expression of the will
of the people, and accordingly includes the right of the people to
determine their own political, economic, and cultural status, together
with what form of government shall attain permanent sovereignty over
their territory, natural wealth and resources.
It has been said that every ethno-cultural group which constitutes
the majority in a cultural area has the right to create a national State
of its own. On the other hand, the theory has been advanced that the
right of self-determination transcends such majority-minority divisions,
and is applicable only to nations. This latter term connotes large
groups of people inhabiting and identified with a particular territory,
sharing common historical traditions, normally speaking a common
143 A/Res./2535 (xxiv).
144 M. WHIT=EAN, supra note 127, at 66-73; Bos, Self-Determination by the Grace of
History, 15 Nm'ER. ANDs INT'L L. REv. 362 (1968).
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tongue, who feel that they form a single and exclusive community,
sharing compatible views as to their future political and civil association.
The right of self-determination may also be said to apply to any
reasonably designated group, and this is the crux of the problem. It
is not that individuals ask to form an independent state; it is that there
are several groups of people in the world, who may or may not be
"nations," which demand self-determination and its corollary, political
independence. There is no agreement as to where to draw the line, and
thus the political doctrine has failed to find a juridical foundation that
would lend itself to legal implementation without resort to insurrec-
tion or a "war of liberation."
Essentially the doctrine of self-determination gained recognition
as a principle of international law after World War I; indeed, pro-
cedures for the realization of this right were incorporated into the
mandate system itself. It is clear, however, that under article 22 of
the League of Nations Covenant,145 the right of self-determination was
reserved to non-self-governing territories. The mandate system was
thus justified as a means of aiding the establishment of self-governing
institutions in the mandate countries. Therefore, to the extent that the
mandate country was subject to the "tutelage" of the Mandatory
Power, the right of self-determination was reserved for the people of
the mandated territory.
In an effort to facilitate the eventual creation of a Jewish National
Home, the greatest restrictions upon the right of self-determination
under any mandate were imposed on the Palestinian people. To the
extent that this attempted reconciliation of such antagonistic goals,
placed greater restrictions upon the right of self-government, it can
definitely be said that the establishment of the Jewish National Home
conflicted with the right of self-determination.
Although article 2, which enumerates the principles of the United
Nations, does not specifically refer to the right of self-determination,
the doctrine was in fact incorporated into the United Nations Charter.
Article 1 declares that the purpose of the United Nations is to develop
friendly relations among nations "based on respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.' 14 It is clear that
the use of the singular noun "principle" indicates that "equal rights
and self-determination of peoples" are considered elements of a single
principle. The same phrase occurs in article 55 which deals not with
political but with social and economic matters. Many scholars feel,
145 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22.
146 U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
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however, that the enunciation of the principal of self-determination in
the Charter is not the embodiment in toto of the positive aspects of
that concept.147 For example, Hans Kelsen in The Law of the United
Nations has stated:
If the "peoples" in Article 1, paragraph 2 means the same as "na-
tions" in the Preamble, then "equal rights and self-determination
of peoples" in Article 1, paragraph 2 can only refer to the sover-
eignty of states.148
It can be said, therefore, that while the Charter did not establish
self-determination of peoples in the ethno-political sense as a principle
of the organizational structure of the United Nations, by incorporating it
in the material sense it did provide a general and recognized principle of
international law.149 References to self-determination, however, appear
in Chapter XII (International Trusteeship System). These sections
refer to self-government and independence even though not specifically
to self-determination, and are the counterparts of article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations. Other provisions of the Charter
also evidence this principle. Article 73 (referring to trusteeship obliga-
147 L. BLOOMFIELD, EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION? THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PROBLEM
OF PEACEFUL CHANGE (1957); H. LAUTERPAcHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(1950); A. R6LING, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN EXPANDED WORLD (1960); F. SAYEGH, THE
ARAB-IsRAELi CONFLICT 9 (N.Y. Arab Information Center, 1964); Scelle, QUELQUEs REFLEx-
IONS SUR LE DROIT DES PEUPLES A DISPOSER D'EUX MPMES (1957); Bowett & Emerson, Self-
Determination, 1966 Proceedings AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 130, 138; de Nova, The International
Protection of National Minorities and Human Rights, 11 How. L.J. 275, 276 (1965); Lauter-
pacht, Ragles Gdndrales du Droit de la Paix, Hague Rec. 1937- IV; From Protection of
Minorities to Promotion of Human Rights, 1948 JEwISH Y.B. INT'L L. 119.
148 H. KELSEN, THE LAw OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1950).
149 See M. SHURRI, THE CONcEI'T OF SELF-DETERmINATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS
(1965); Bowett, Self-Determination and Political Rights in Developing Countries, 1966
Proceedings Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 129. The subsequent history of the United Nations cor-
roborates the proposition that it is more than a recognized concept and has become a
general principle of international law. See, e.g., the General Assembly's request of the
Commission on Human Rights to study ways and means "which would ensure the right
of peoples and nations to self-determination." G.A. Res. 421, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at
43, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). At its Seventh Session the General Assembly stated that "all
peoples shall have the right of self determination." G.A. Res. 545, 6 U.N. GAOR Supp.
20, at 36-37, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952). The Commission on Human Rights prepared several
resolutions on the matter which were adopted by the General Assembly. G.A. Res. 837,
9 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954); G.A. Res. 9 U.N. GAOR Supp.
21, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954); G.A. Res. 738, 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 18, U.N.
Doc. A/2630 (1958); GA. Res. 612, 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952);
G.A. Res. 611, 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952); G.A. Res. 648, 7
U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952); G.A. Res. 637, 7 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 20, at 26, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952). See also Colonial Resolution, G.A. Res. 1514, 15
U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/L. 323 (1960). At its Tenth Session the General
Assembly examined the draft articles of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which were adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6546 (1966). See also Eagleton,
Self-Determination in the United Nations, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 88 (1953).
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tions) clearly imposes a duty, deemed "a sacred TRUST," to ensure,
with due respect for the particular culture, the political, economic,
social and educational advancement, the just treatment and the pro-
tection against abuses of the peoples concerned, thus, "to develop self-
government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the
peoples ..... ,5 0 In addition, article 76 which sets forth the basic ob-
jectives of the trusteeship system states:
To promote the political, economic, social and educational ad-
vancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories and their pro-
gressive development towards self-government or independence as
may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each terri-
tory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples
concerned and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship
agreement. 151
Finally, article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
adopted by the General Assembly provides that "[t]he will of the
people shall be the basis of the authority of government .... " 152
The United Nations has indeed a prolific history of resolutions
seeking to uphold and implement the principle of self-determination.
Notwithstanding these pronouncements, Professor Sohn states:
With regard to the principle of self-determination, although in-
ternational recognition was extended to this principle at the end of
the First World War and it was adhered to with regard to the
other Arab territories, at the time of the creation of the "A"
Mandates, it was not applied to Palestine, obviously because of the
intention to make possible the creation of the Jewish National
Home there. Actually, it may well be said that the Jewish National
Home and the sui generis Mandate for Palestine run counter to
that principle. 53
The American position is, in that respect, theoretically in full
support of the concept. Professor Moore quotes Thomas Jefferson who,
as Secretary of State in 1792, with reference to the recognition of
France's revolutionary government stated:15 4 "It accords with our
principles to acknowledge any government to be rightful which is
formed by the will of the nation, substantially declared."'15 Less remote
is the particular significance which the doctrine has assumed with the
1O U.N. CHARTa art. 73.
151 U.N. CHARTER art. 76.
152 G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/555, at 71 (1948).
153 L. SOHN, CAW AND MATERIALS ON UNrnD NATIONs LAw 429 (1967).
1541 J. MooRE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 120 (1906).
15 Id.
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international dislocation of the present century. In a speech, President
Wilson proposed
[t]hat no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other
nation or people, but that every people should be left free to
determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered,
unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and power-
ful.1 56
Reminiscent of the Wilsonian philosophy is the Atlantic Charter
which in expressing the ideals of the United States and Great Britain
established:
They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of govern-
ment under which they live; and they wish to see sovereign rights
and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly
deprived of them.157
The same was embodied in the Declaration of Yalta on Febru-
ary 11, 1945, with respect to Europe; and what had been the position
of the United States and France became that of the Allies and a
cornerstone of the United Nations principles. Yet the principle was
violated more often than it was implemented. It was given effect in
Algeria, but violated or ignored in such cases as Formosa, Hyderabad,
Kashmir, Palestine, the Congo, Cuba, Hungary, Viet Nam, Nigeria
(Biafra), Goa, Angola, Czechoslovakia and in the matter of "Germany's
unification" - to speak only of the most notorious instances.
CONSEQUENCES OF ARAB EXPERIENCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND ITS STRUCTURES, THE WESTERN POWERS AND ISRAEL
The Arab people, throughout their experience with Western
powers, have, by and large, been the object of colonial domination,
military occupation, and economic exploitation. Finally, with the
creation of the State of Israel they have witnessed the implantation
of a new State, composed of alien people, to occupy a portion of their
territory. Israel thus became in the eyes of the Arabs not only the
creation of the same Western powers who colonized them, but an
extension thereof. Not only was the land Israel occupied usurped but
the question of its future intentions became paramount. The first
156 A League for Peace, S. Doc. No. 685, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1917). See also his
address before a joint session of Congress, Jan. 8, 1918 (For. Rel. Supp. 1, Vol. 1) for his
fourteen points.
157 Declaration by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill (Aug. 14, 1941), in
A DECADE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN Poucy: BASIC DOCUMENTS (1941-1949). See also Kunz, The
Present Status of International Law for the Protection of Minorities, 48 AM. J. INT'L L.
282 (1954).
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indication of its future course was its refusal to repatriate the Pales-
tinians, while pursuing an active policy of recruiting immigrants
from abroad. The pattern was obvious; Palestinian rights and aspira-
tions were to be subordinated to Israel's in-gathering policy. The
gradual swelling of Jewish immigration coupled with the avowed
pledge of Israel to "return" all Jews, paralleled events that led to the
gradual expansion of the territory under Israel's occupation. The con-
clusion was that Israel's main purpose lies in gradual expansionism to
accommodate a progressive flow of Jewish immigration at the expense
of the Arab peoples. Thus, it appears that such an objective is in-
compatible with the goals of Arab national regionalism and is itself
a new form of imperialism. 158 When one considers Western support
158 The efforts of Zionism first produced the Balfour Declaration (discussed at notes
93-104 and accompanying text supra.) The next step was a massive world-wide propaganda
campaign designed to convey the impression in world public opinion that only the "promise
clause" was relevant in the entire instrument. The Declaration then found its way to the
Preamble of the mandate provisions of the League of Nations Covenant; Zionists thus
shared in the administration of Palestine and immigrants started to enter. Eventually,
established quotas were ignored and illegal immigration flooded Palestine. In an effort
to cloak this illegality in an air of respectability, the propaganda machine, playing on
post-World War II sympathies, developed such incidents as depicted in the book and film
Exodus into both legend and epic. Several hundred thousand Jews from over forty nations
came to Palestine between 1939-1946 (no precise figures can be cited). Notwithstanding the
fact that the Arab population numbered 900,000 and Jewish citizens and residents (official
immigrants not yet citizens) numbered 450,000, in addition to which there were an esti-
mated 250,000 illegal Jewish immigrants, the partition plan gave the proposed Jewish state
58 percent of Palestine. After 1948 Israel took 23 percent more of that portion of Palestine
allotted by the Partition Plan to the "Arab State."
As to its neighboring states, Israel committed aggression in 1956 and started the mili-
tary operations of the 1967 war. The occupied territories from then on have been settled
by Israelis and there are indications of Israel's intention to annex some or all of that
territory, as they have made it clear with respect to Jerusalem notwithstanding the United
Nations condemnation of its annexation. See notes 17-23 supra. Within Israeli-held terri-
tory the Palestinian's experience is more startling.
It started with forcible expulsions, examples of which are indicated below:
1. On February 28, 1949, 700 refugees were expelled from the village of Kfar Yasif.
2. On June 5, 1949, the inhabitants of Hisam, Qatia and Jauneh in Galilee were
expelled from their villages.
3. On January 24, 1950, the inhabitants of Ghasbyia were expelled.
4. In March 1950, the inhabitants of Batal were expelled.
5. On August 17, 1950, the inhabitants of Mijdal were expelled.
6. In February 1951, the inhabitants of 13 villages in Wadi Ara were expelled over
the Israeli frontier.
7. On November 17, 1951, a military detachment surrounded the village of Buwaishat,
expelled the inhabitants and dynamited their homes.
8. In September 1953, the inhabitants of Umm-el-Faraj were expelled from their vil-
lage, which was immediately blown up.
Along with expulsion, several laws in Israel "legalized" expropriations:
1. The Law on the Acquisition of Absentee Property of 1950, which stipulates that
the land and the property of a person declared an "absentee" is transferred to the Cus-
todian of Absentee Property. Law of March 14, 1950, Absentees' Property Law, [1950] 4
LAws or TnE STATE or IsRAE.L 68. "Absentee" is defined as
[a]ny person who is a citizen of Israel, but who left his place of residence between
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for Israel in light of the Arab experience with the same powers and
their international structures, it is understandable that a sense of hope-
November 29, 1947 and the day on which the State of Emergency was abrogated,
. . . if he went: (a) to a place which before 1 September 1948 was outside the
land of Israel; (b) to a place inside the land of Israel but occupied at that time
by hostile forces. Paragraph 28 empowers the Custodian to decide "in writing
that a person or a group of persons are absentees," at which time "this person
or group of persons shall be regarded as absentee."
Such language speaks for itself. Let it suffice to say that it has resulted in the con-
fiscation of hundreds of thousands of dunums (measure of land) without due process of
law.
Indeed, land which was part of the Islamic Wagi or religious trusts was transferred to the
custodian of absentee property. This included one-sixth of the total area of Palestine's
usable land in 1950.
2. Article 25 of the Defence Laws (State of Emergency, 1945) empowers the Military
Governors to declare specific closed areas which no one can enter or leave without a
written permit from the Military Governor.
3. The Emergency Laws promulgated by the Minister of Defence in 1949 "empower
the Minister of Defence to declare any area inside the Land of Israel a Security Area."
Law of July 27, 1949, Emergency Regulations (Security Zones) (Extension of Validity)
(No. 2) Law, [1949] 3 LAws or THE STATE or IsRAEL 56.
4. The Emergency Articles for the Exploitation of Uncultivated Lands is the link in
the chain of laws for the expropriation of Arab lands. This law empowers the Minister
of Agriculture to "take possession of uncultivated land, to ensure it is cultivated in cases
where 'the Minister is not satisfied that the owner of the land has begun, or is about to
begin, to cultivate it, or is going to continue to cultivate it.'" Official Gazette, October
15, 1948, at 8.
Sabri Jiryis explains the use of these laws as follows. The Minister of Defense, by
virtue of the Emergency Laws of 1949, declares a certain area a closed area, or a security
area, entry to which without a written permit from the Military Governor is a grave
security offence. At the same time, of course, the Military Governor is unwilling, "for
reasons of state security," to grant such permits to the owners of the land, which soon
becomes "uncultivated land." When this happens, the Minister of Agriculture immediately
issues an order to the effect that the land is "uncultivated." This in turn gives him the
right, "in order to ensure that it is cultivated," to have such land cultivated either "by
laborers engaged by him" or by "handing it over to another party to cultivate it." The
other party is always the neighboring Jewish colonist. According to the original version
of the Emergency Articles, the Minister of Agriculture could not keep such uncultivated
land for more than two years and eleven months from the date he takes possession of it.
But this period was later extended to five years by an "extension order." And eventually
the ownership of such land reverted to the State.
There are five more of these laws. Each of them effectively enabled the state to grab
more and more land. Jiryis feels that the estimate of one million dunums of land expro-
priated from Arabs living in Israel can be regraded as reasonable and accurate. Accounts
of several incidents follow:
Radio Israel confirmed the fact that nearly 300 hectares of land in East (Arab)
Jerusalem had been requisitioned by the Israeli Government; about 7,000 Jewish
families will be able to live there.
L'Orient, January 11, 1968.
Israel announced the expropriation of 838 acres of the former Jordanian
sector of Jerusalem.
Herald Tribune, January 16, 1968.
Hundreds of Israeli citizens gathered today in front of the Land Registration
Department to buy 265 lots of land offered for sale in Arab Jerusalem by the
Israeli Government.
Al-Anwar, March 1968.
A decree signed by the Israeli Minister of Finance, Mr. Pinhas Sapir, makes
legal the expropriation of 190 acres on the road to Ramallah. This expropriation
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lessness and frustration resulted. The consequence was a realization
that international law and international organizations are tools used
to attain desired goals by certain nations and that impartiality or
equal treatment for non-Western or nonaligned nations is a futile
expectation.
In short, if the Mandate was valid and properly carried out, why
were the rights of the Palestinians disregarded? The United Nations,
as the successor to the League of Nations, partitioned the State, which
Israel thereafter expanded territorially. In the interim, the United
Nations spoke of self-determination, protection of civil, religious, and
political rights, and repatriation of Palestinians. It also condemned
the annexation of Jerusalem, affirmed its commitment to the principle
that force is not a valid means of acquiring territory, and ordered
Israel's withdrawal from occupied territory after 1967. Despite these
laudable positions, the practical results for the Arabs were to the con-
trary. Not one of these principles or decisions was implemented; thus,
the route of peaceful resolution failed. Arabs took to arms- in fact
and in words - when all else, in their eyes, had failed. Perhaps Israel's
worst accomplishment thus far has been its military victories, which
have left its opponents more aggrieved and wronged than before, and
thus, only too eager to recover the accrued losses. Somehow it seems
that what has transpired can only lead to further escalation. Israel
cannot seem to "shoot its way to peace," and the Arabs cannot seem
to "swallow Israel with gun powder."
Everyone who has followed the development of this conflict has
at one time or another asked a rather simple question: Why has there
been no dialogue between the parties? Indeed, we have all witnessed
a dual monologue, each side advocating its own position while, at the
is intended for the establishment of a Jewish settlement.
Le Monde, April 20, 1968.
The Israeli authorities announced that they will expropriate 300 dunums in
the neighborhood of Jerusalem on the pretext of wanting to plant a forest and
name it the forest of peace, on the occasion of the unification of Jerusalem.
L'Orient, May 22, 1968.
The Mufti of Jerusalem protested against the expropriation of 29 acres that
belongs to Muslim Waqf property. The Mufti went on to say that there were 5
mosques, 4 schools, and between 1,000 and 15,000 houses on the land.
L'Orient, June 5, 1968.
Mr. Ruhi el-Rhatib, the Arab Mayor of Jerusalem, declared that 116 dunums
had recently been expropriated in the Arab sector of Jerusalem. The Israeli au-
thorities had thus seized 1,048 apartments and houses inhabited by 6,000 Arabs
in addition to 437 shops employing 700 people, 4 mosques, 4 old palaces and 2
schools.
Le Monde, June 20, 1968.
And so the program of expropriation of Palestinians continues while territorial ex-
pansion at the expense of neighboring states corroborates Arab distrust of Israel's alleged
peaceful intentions.
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same time, it remains oblivious to the other. The only lesson to be
derived from this state of affairs is that both sides long for a "judge."
The tradition of the Semitic people- whether Muslims, Christians
or Jews- has been one of acceptance of law and obedience to its
judgments. To that extent, the statesmen and diplomats of the world
community have ignored this significant factor which would have re-
quired a process, a legal process, to direct this dual monologue. But
lest the reader misunderstand us, the Rule of Law is not a matter of
mere technicalities, and moral authority is not political power, just as
peaceful solutions cannot only be predicated upon material considera-
tion. To understand the Arabs, and we venture to say the Israelis as
well, we cannot accept the proposition that their peaceful coexistence
be viewed only in terms of material well-being. Ignoring the sense of
historic dignity of the Arab peoples has resulted, and will continue to
result, in misdirected efforts, just as Arab misunderstanding of Jewish
history has proven an overwhelming stumbling block. So as not to
avoid answering the question presented above, Arabs will engage in
dialogue and are ready to accept peace with the people of Israel; the
question is not will they, but how will they and why?
Negotiations are a means and not an end to effect a compromised
result, which the parties cannot assess or anticipate without direct
contact, thereby leading to a gradual rapprochement, brought about by
their shared goals or mutually agreed upon interests. Before even reach-
ing the question of substance, that of form is very significant. The
argument may be reminiscent of the Paris peace talks which at one
time hinged on the shape of the conference table. It is, nonetheless,
a fundamental fact that the road to peace with the Arabs is not the
gun or the pocketbook, but the language of the heart in the proper
accompanying form. Regardless of how this argument may sound to
the Western mind, it is a true historic reflection of Arab culture. To
a proud nation humbled by defeat, the memory of past greatness and
glory is indispensable and explains the necessity for the preservation
of its moral integrity.
As to the question of substance, strong advocates of "negotiations"
refute any a priori consideration of the relative positions of the parties
with respect to their goals and interests; thus precluding any examina-
tion of the degree of flexibility of these positions. To ignore irrevo-
cable or uncompromising announced positions accompanied by overt
conduct to that effect implies that negotiations as to these given ques-
tions are doomed to failure. Consider the issue of territory occupied by
force by Israel, and more significantly Jerusalem. The United Nations
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has declared that these territories are to be returned. The Israeli re-
sponse, evidenced by its annexation policies, was an avowed refusal to
comply, to what extent can subsequent "negotiations" be distinguished
from "capitulation"? The historical parallel recalls Pope Pius VII who,
in response to Napoleon's occupation of the Papal States and requested
negotiation for their return, is reported to have answered from his
prison in Savona: "No special treaty was required to return stolen
property."'15 9
As negotiations are intended to produce what Israel avows its goals
to be, i.e., security, Israel's objective has been to trade its military su-
premacy for legitimacy. Somehow it is felt by many that military
supremacy is no substitute for legitimacy or voluntariness, just as sub-
mission is not the same as consent. Condonation does not erase the
original transgression, but at least it has an element, even though
ex post facto, of voluntariness. Its validity is dependent upon the degree
of prior or subsequent coercion, be it military, political, economical
or psychological.
The reader must be alerted to the significance of the values em-
bodied in such word symbols as "peace" and "security," since these
conditions are the goals of the desired negotiations. Their significance
will be determined by the social values ascribed to them by those who
will be expected to adhere to them. On that assumption, the values em-
bodied in the concepts of peace and security must be contemplated
within the historical, cultural, social, and psychological framework of
the Arab world; spawning from its roots in Islam to contemporary
social psychology (including the Arab experience with Israel and its
supporters). The term Arab, while in itself a subject of fascinating
conjecture, must be accepted, notwithstanding its historical trans-
formations, as indicating at least a people linked by the religious,
spiritual, and cultural heritage of Islam as well as by the Arabic
language. While one may question the absolute relevance of this
observation, it is made with direct reference to the question of peace
and security.
For some 12 centuries, the Arabs, as the major ethnic component
of the Muslim State, viewed the world as divided into Dar El-Islam
and Dar El-Harb. Dar El-Islam was also Dar Es-Se 1m, the land of peace,
contrasted by the land of war. Dar Es-Selm represented the ideological
value which Islam ascribed to the freedom of propagation of Islam in
that given part of the world. But due to the fundamental universalism
of Islam, that part of the world to which Islam could not be propa-
159 J. HE.RoLD, THE AGE OF NAPOLEON 863 (1963).
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gated in peace was a denial of that fundamental concept of freedom
so dear to Islam's first adherents, the Arabs. The alternative was to
break open these barriers to freedom, whereupon it would be pro-
claimed as Dar El-Harb. Another observation, significant at this point,
is the etymological origin of the word "peace," which in Arabic is
the same as that of istislam, or "surrender." Indeed, so slight is the
semantic variation between the two words that it compels the conclu-
sion that the use of the word "peace," if not in the proper formal
context, could mean istislam and not salam, or "surrender" and not
"peace."'160
Historically, selm or "peace" is value-related to the concept of
"freedom." Freedom of thought, speech, choice, religion, movement
and all forms of human and ideological activities deemed fundamental
among the natural rights of man, as embodied in Islamic precepts.
Translated to the contemporary problem, the alien ideology of Zionism
is, therefore, a basic impediment to "peace," as it stands in contradic-
tion and opposition to the free propagation of "Arabism," the suc-
cessor, popular ideological concept to Islam - successor, not in the
religious sense, but in terms of its acceptance as the common denomi-
nator of the people. As such, Arabism, replacing what Islam had once
been, is the new ideological and psychological bond of the Arabs.
Hence, the effective prohibition of the propagation or dissemination
of Arabism by Israel in what is deemed Arab land, is tantamount to
a direct challenge to Arabism's very existence. This explains the readi-
ness of Arabs to accept such formulas as Israel's "de-Zionization" or
"Arabization." There is probably no literal significance attached to
these proposed notions, for one can hardly envision a Pole, Russian,
Hungarian, German or other, being literally "Arabized" for what that
may mean. The significance of the point lies in the ideological, value-
oriented goal of the State, be it called Israel, Palestine, or as could be
suggested, "the United Arab Republic of Israel and Palestine," if a new
name is all it would take.
In essence, it is not whether that State will adhere to Arab nation-
alism, for that would be asking of it more than other Arab States, but
whether it is open to the possibility. Thus, presently Israel not only
disrupts the geographic contiguity of the Arab states, but also disrupts
its ideological continuity. Whether we are dealing with an open-ended
Zionist ideology or a limited one (narrowed by emerging nationalistic
tendencies, brought about in Israel by its "Sabras"), such an Arabiza-
160 Bassiouni, supra note 35, at 160.
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tion concept if presented as a superior or supplanting ideology will be
hopelessly unacceptable to Israel. However, if it were offered as a
broadening concept, relating "the Love of Zion" to "the Love of the
Arab World," of which it is geographically a part, the concept would
have some chance of being favorably received; and, therefore, the
ideological confrontation may not be unavoidable. Obviously, this
would require a reconsideration of the "Jewish people" concept, to
which Israel's ruling class still adheres, as it was formulated in the
wake of European anti-Semitism. With over 60 percent of Israel's
population consisting of native born, and over half a million Sephardic
Jews (Arab Jews), and now a larger segment of Muslim and Christian
Arabs, Israel is not and will not be the same exclusivist State it had
once hoped to be. Already signs of its transformation are appearing,
even though it is premature to foretell their future course.
Tm ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND THE "ARAB REVOLUTION"
Most writers believe that the central issue in Middle East
affairs is the conflict over Palestine. Reporters, editors, commentators,
and politicians interpret virtually every event in this context. In the
end, their judgments are often dangerously misguided because they
start from this premise to the exclusion of other considerations.
Certainly, the military and political conflict between Israel and
some of her Arab neighbors has been the most spectacular feature of
Middle East affairs for more than 20 years. It demands our notice,
enlists our sympathies and grips our interest; but it is not and cannot
be the most significant Middle East problem. If Israel should vanish
from world maps tomorrow, the Arab regions would continue to live
in torment and turmoil. Even if Israel is the apparent catalyst today,
its role is aggravated by its ability to exploit an existing situation to
its best interest.
A hundred million Arabs are casting aside the ways and ideas of
an older time and looking forward to building a new Arab world.
What has been, passes away; what shall be, is yet dimly seen as the
Arab people strive to realize their rising expectations. This, too, is
conflict. On one side stand those who cling to a dead past; on the
other are those who plan and struggle to build toward something
better. This is revolution. When the fact of Arab revolution is recog-
nized and accepted, the events of the last two decades reveal a clear,
unmistakable historical pattern. Men and movements, wars and politi-
cal maneuvers fall into historical perspective as readily as the pieces of
a jigsaw puzzle mate to reveal their ordained pattern.
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Exclusive concern for Israel confuses the judgment of those who
look upon the struggle merely as between Israel and the neighboring
Arab States, thus misunderstanding the true nature of Middle East
problems and failing even to recognize the basic character of the Pales-
tine issue itself. Indeed, the observer can clearly see, if he will, the fact
that every guerrilla infiltration, every commando raid, every act of
sabotage has been the work, not of Israel's neighboring States, but of
Palestinians determined to regain their homeland. States like Egypt,
Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, which have given refuge to displaced Pal-
estinians, as indeed they have, and made little effort to interfere with
the activities of Al Fateh and other Palestinian groups, recall that, for
a decade, the United States has given protection to refugees from
Cuba, who have fought with arms obtained inside the United States;
and large numbers of Americans have not only cheered but also aided
them in the 1961 abortive Cuban invasion. The Palestinian freedom
fighters are one segment of the Arab popular revolutionary trend. To
oppose them is to accelerate local revolutionary movements which al-
ready threaten to burst throughout the entire Arab world.
An understanding of the roots of this trend is necessary. After
the rise of nationalism and access to independence by the Arab States,
economic necessity brought about Arab socialism. Arab socialism was
not and is not the communism of the Soviet Union or China, nor is it
the "Middle Way" of the Scandinavian countries; it is as an Arab
program derived from Arab experiences to serve Arab needs. It did
not spring from any body of socio-economic theory and has no or-
ganized ideology. It is still an inchoate movement, feeling its way for-
ward, testing ideas, keeping those that work and discarding those that
fail, governed by experience and undaunted by the problems that lie
ahead. While it is groping for answers, one certain fact emerges - its
immediate objective is socio-political and economic justice. Exactly
where the priority lies and where the emphasis is to be laid is what
truly differentiates among the Arab regimes in power today and dis-
tinguishes the various local revolutionary movements.
The very first manifestation of the Arab revolution is that where
it advances, kings vanish, such as in Egypt, Iraq, Yemen and Lybia.
Monarchies have been replaced by military dictatorships, but the
following phase is one of popular movements to replace the sec-
tarianism which has characterized the first phase. As French and
British power evaporated in the Middle East and American power
undertook to replace it with uncertainty and lack of purpose, it in-
herited an enmity which it had not sown, while fostering the belief
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that its goals are neo-imperialistic as its policy often may have sug-
gested. Like the French and British before them, American policy-
makers concerned themselves with the effort to maintain the political
and economic status quo. Only then, so it was believed, could the
enormous American interests in Arab oil be protected and the mili-
tarily strategic location that so recently had been a Franco-British
enclave be preserved. America thereby earned the title of "colonial
heir," and when it finds itself assuming the wardship of Israel, the
effect of these roles on Arab-American relations is devastating.
The third phase of the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 brought the
Soviet Union into the Middle East as a military power to reckon with,
just as the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 has provided the political opening
that Russia had sought in vain through long generations. Today, the
Mediterranean, long a British lake, then an American mare nostrum,
is no longer a closed sea. Soviet power already deprives the United
States of the ability to determine the course of events in the Medi-
terranean basin, and the Soviet presence suggests that Western at-
tempts to dictate the Arab future have now been foreclosed.
The role of the Soviet Union in Arab affairs is derivative of
American-Israeli polarization of the conflict. The most telling fact
is that no communist party exists in the Arab States, and the people
have no sympathy for the Soviets. But the political alliance at the
international level is a necessity dictated by America's one-sided posi-
tion. Thus, the Soviet Union's influence in the outcome of the conflict
is a factor which is a consequence of the American position and can,
therefore, be controlled by the United States. Socialist doctrine is
strong in the Arab world, but Marxism is relatively weak among left-
wing thinkers, who, whatever doctrines they relate to, almost invariably
adapt it to the context of Arab nationalism. Russian communism is not
an element of the Arab revolution, and no strings pulled in Moscow
will affect its course or future.
The Arab revolution transcends any local dispute and internal
question. The struggle of the Arab peoples against what they believe
is neo-imperialism and social inequities continues unabated in search
of a more positive identity. One thing remains certain - the Arab
peoples look forward to an Arab nation, and in the process of such a
quest lies the difficulty of finding a common political ideology for all
Arab peoples. The larger question of the Arab revolution does not
absorb (though it encompasses), the many different and varied internal
problems of each Arab State. Amidst these, Israel is only one prob-
lem - even though it appears to loom so largely over the others.
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CONCLUSION
Those who founded and still govern Israel, although some of
Palestinian birth, were and are Europeans. They were bred in a Eu-
ropean culture, though it may have been affected by common religious
tradition. As the British historian Hugh Trevor-Roper has observed,
the history of European and other Western Jewry is an integral part
of European history.16'
The customs, traditions and systems of law developed among the
Arabs and other non-European peoples have had no discoverable im-
pact on international law as it now exists. Arabs are products of an
Islamic culture that has its roots in the Judaeo-Christian heritage but
differs sharply from that which the same has become in the Western
world. Yet, existing international law demands that Arabs abide by
such customs, practices and precedents, in the shaping of which they
have had no part whatever. It may justly be said that they are com-
pelled to play for very high stakes under rules compiled by their
antagonists and adversaries.
It is significant that the acceptance of the Zionist Organization
as an international public body, the Palestine Mandate, and the in-
corporation of the Balfour Declaration in the Mandate Agreement
were all decreed by Europeans, in direct defiance of declared and
demonstrated Arab interests - that an ancient country dominated by
Islamic tradition and culture has, in crude fact, been seized and appro-
priated for a new extension of the areas dominated by European
culture.
The concept of law and the Rule of Law is not alien to either
the Arabs or Islam itself. The Islamic heritage is one of law in its
purest form.16 2 In fact, the history of the present conflict demonstrates
that from its inception the Arabs have sought to rely upon the precepts
of international law and its organized structures to resolve the prob-
lem. It was not until their realization of its failure that the present
escalating trend of self-help has materialized.163
A sound historical hypothesis is that events of a crude and violent
nature - war, revolution, the rise of tyranny - are usually not trig-
gered by ideas, ideals and beliefs which are the result of thought in
evolution. Ideology is seldom the catalyst that induces violence, al-
though it is often the target at which the opponents of revolutionary,
and even evolutionary, change aim.
161 Trevor-Roper, Jewish and Other Nationalisms, CoMMENTARY, Jan. 1963, at 15-29.
162 Bassiouni, supra note 33, at 120.
163 Bassiouni, supra note 18. See note 158 and accompanying text supra.
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In the Middle East today there exists two basic ideological con-
flicts -Arabism versus Zionism and Arab revolutionism versus re-
actionalism. It is the situational factors derived from these ideological
conflicts which constantly threaten the peace and security of the Middle
East; and as to the first, it is a political challenge to the Rule of Law
in its quest for the peaceful resolution of world conflicts. In this
regard, two basic points must be considered.
1. If the Arab-Israeli conflict is to be considered a permanent
feature of the Middle East, deriving solely from irreconcilable ideol-
ogies, the conclusion is inevitable that peace and security will be pos-
sible only when one or the other can be annihilated or thoroughly
subjugated by military force.
2. If, however, conflict is not deemed a permanent condition in
the relations of Middle East peoples but a consequence of competing
aspirations and struggling ambitions amenable to solutions other than
inevitable collision, then the conclusion must be that the risk of
violence between the parties can be obviated by a resolution of those
situational factors that produce the violence.
Significantly, every violent episode throughout the history of the
conflict has resulted from a situational factor only indirectly related
to the central ideological conflict. The direct causes of these episodes
have rarely, if ever, been within the individual or exclusive control
of any contestants, yet despite the professed desire of the parties to
prevent it, conflict has resulted. If this assumption is accurate, then
elimination of those situational factors would remove the risk of mili-
tary confrontation which threatens world peace. The legal and political
aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict have been widely discussed, and in
another forum one of the authors of this article stated: "In the history
of modem world conflict, there is no other instance where the very
nature of the conflict can be examined in its entirety in a legal con-
text."' 64 This does not imply that a legal determination is possible in
the present practice of world affairs. Almost all the "political" issues
of the Palestine question and the conflict between Israel and some
of the Arab states are superimposed upon legal claims and moral
rationalizations, or vice-versa. Thus, it is theoretically possible, and
quite realistic in an anachronistic sense, to resolve the entirety of -the
Arab-Israeli conflict on a legal basis. Therefore, the Arab States and
the United Arab Republic, in particular, seek to submit some or all
of these legal issues to the International Court of Justice; Israel con-
sistently refuses.
10 Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 51.
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The lack of compulsory international adjudication of world
conflicts provides the perfect escape for any nation which lives in
the world community by means of self-serving might to the
detriment of the peace-serving maintenance of world public order.
The resolution of world conflicts by the Rule of Force and not by
the Rule of Law is the most constant threat to world public order. 65
Although sporadic military encounters will occur, the bitter Arab-
Israeli quarrel may well end, not in ultimate military confrontation
but in the rapidly proceeding Arabization of the Zionist state. This
process will be the result of the large influx of Jewish immigrants from
Arab lands - men and women bred not in a Western but in an Islamic
and Arabic culture- and the many Arabs living under Israeli rule.
The Europeans who established Israel and still dominate both its poli-
tics and economy have been reduced to less than one-third of Israel's
population. Experience and simple logic suggest that no minority can
long control any country. Already Israel has ceased to be the European
state in an Arab sea that its founder envisioned, and the Arabization
of Israel is starting.166
The very real likelihood is that before many years pass, Israel
will be ruled by its majority, by people who are either themselves
Arabs or have a history of 13 centuries of friendly coexistence with
the Arabs. At their vanguard will be the "Sabras" - born and raised
in Israel. They will view their future as part of the Arabs region and
not as a beholden outpost of European Zionism.
This, of course, will depend upon Israel's realization that the
arrogance of her present power must abate, if and when Arab power
is not one day to repay it in kind.
In this event, the Arab-Israeli conflict that so dominates world
public interest in Middle East affairs will simply wither away. Arabs
will see no need to arm themselves for either defense or aggression
against their Arab neighbors. Meanwhile, however, the "Arab revolu-
tion" will go on for several generations. Precisely what path it will
take or how fast it will advance no one can say, but that revolution
in the Arab lands will continue seems as certain as anything natural
can be.
The "Arab Revolution" will dominate the search for identity and
realization of the emerging Arab masses who long for no more than
to enjoy life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness in human dignity.
165 Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 51-52.
166 See 0. FRIEDMAN, THE END OF THE JEVISH PEOPLE (1967). See also U. AvNErY, supra
note 59.
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Yet, the most fundamental moralizing effect of religion remains smoth-
ered. Islam has not played its full and mature role in the development
of this course of events. The contribution of Islam can have untold
effects upon the development of the Arab world and its future institu-
tions. Islam remains, however, the main barrier against communism
in the Arab world and must be regarded as the main tenet of moral
strength in the Arab world of today and tomorrow.
There are too many imponderables to predict the immediate
future, but certainly the long-range course of the Arab world is un-
mistakably clear; and Israel or Palestine, whatever the label, will be
part of that Arab world of tomorrow.
